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 “The Portuguese ovserseas expansion is one of the most interesting research areas for 
historians. […]The consequences were, either regarding the mother country or the 
countries to where the Portuguese sailed, incalculable and one has to ask himself 
repeatedly how it was possible that the small country Portugal managed to accomplish 
this enormous achievement.”  
(Hermann Kellenbenz, 1970) 
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Abstract  
 
The present thesis Shipwrecks of the “Carreira da Índia” (1595-1623) – Sources 
for the Study in Portuguese Maritime History deals with factors which caused losses of 
ships of the Carreira da Índia which linked the European metropolis Lisbon with its 
Goa based Estado da Índia between 1595 and 1623. Although Portuguese-Asiatic 
shipping was formally separated from the Habsburg Empire during the Union of the 
Two Iberian Crowns (1580-1640), the European policies of the Spanish Kings, 
especially towards the United Provinces and the Netherlands had its influence and 
effects on the Portuguese side. 
Shipwrecks, either on the outward bound or homeward bound voyages had 
occurred for various reasons since the early days of the Carreira da Índia yet the 
emergence of the two private European Companies, the Dutch United East India 
Company (founded in 1602) and the British East India Company (founded in 1600) 
were a new momentum by which’s characteristics of concurrence and struggle for 
supremacy of the European-Asiatic spice trade, losses of Portuguese ships were caused 
by planned and executed military operations as well.  
Focusing on the geographical region of the Mozambique Channel in which the 
losses have taken place, the thesis combines a historiographical approach with records 
of underwater archaeology analyzing questions related to the political environment and 
planed military operations in which shipwrecks have occurred as well as causes of 
shipwrecks observing ship building and design modifications and effects related to 
economic patterns such as the monetary flows of the Portuguese outward bound 
shipping during the period of observation. 
 
 
Key words: 
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Resumo 
 
 A presente dissertação de Mestrado em História, História Marítima pela 
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa e da Escola Naval, intitula-se 
“Shipwrecks of the “Carreira da Índia” (1595-1623) – Sources for the Study in 
Portuguese Maritime History” procura encontrar e analisar os fatores que causaram 
perda de embarcações da Carreira da Índia entre 1595 e 1623. Apesar da administração 
do comércio e navegação luso-asiático estar formalmente separada do império 
Habsburgo durante a União das Duas Coroas Ibéricas (1580-1640), as políticas hispano-
europeias e, particularmente, em relação às Províncias Unidas e aos Países Baixos, 
influenciaram a vertente Portuguesa. 
  Os naufrágios, seja na fase da viagem de ida ou de volta, ocorreram desde os 
primeiros dias da Carreira da Índia mas, o aparecimento das duas companhias privadas 
europeias, a Companhia Holandesa das Índias Orientais (fundada em 1602) e a 
Companhia Inglesa das Índias Orientais (fundada em 1600), pelas suas características de 
concorrência e luta pela supremacia do comércio de especiarias eurasiático, fez com que 
as perdas de embarcações portuguesas resultassem também de operações militares 
planeadas. 
 Centrada na área geográfica do Canal de Moçambique, onde os naufrágios 
ocorreram, a presente dissertação combina uma abordagem historiográfica nacional e 
internacional com dados obtidos por arqueologia subaquática, comparando e  analisando 
questões relacionados com o ambiente político e as operações militares planeadas que 
os envolveram; debruça-se também sobre as causas de perda de embarcações, através da 
observação da construção naval e suas modificações e sobre os efeitos relacionados com 
padrões económicos, tais como fluxos monetários na fase da ida da Carreira da Índia no 
período em análise. 
 Construindo o discurso da dissertação (entre 1595 e 1623) pela cronologia dos 
acontecimentos históricos dos finais do século XVI e início do século XVII, a mesma 
começa com a primeira viagem de uma companhia privada holandesa com base nas 
informações recolhidas e fornecidas por Jan Hyugen van Linschoten sobre a navegação 
portuguesa no Índico, terminando em 1623, ano do massacre de Amboina, que teve 
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como consequência o fim da aliança militar europeia. A escolha da área geográfica, o 
Canal de Moçambique, a passagem entre terra firme do continente africano e a ilha de 
Madagáscar, na época em estudo chamada São Lourenço, prende-se com os seguintes 
motivos: desde o início da Carreira da Índia, a ilha de Moçambique era um dos mais 
importantes entrepostos da navegação portuguesa ao longo da rota do cabo no qual, 
durante o século XVI, foram construídos uma feitoria, um hospital e sistemas 
defensivos como a fortaleza de São Sebastião. Aqui, os navios podiam ser abastecidos 
com água e alimentos e invernar quando o regime de monção não permitia uma 
continuação da viagem de ida ou volta. Da mesma forma, ao longo do período de 1497 
até 1650, cerca de 25 por cento dos naufrágios portugueses ocorreram no Canal de 
Moçambique. 
 Estruturado em cinco capítulos, o discurso começa com uma observação 
genérica do Estado da Índia até 1580 e o aparecimento das duas companhias privadas da 
Europa do norte, a holandesa e a inglesa, centrando-se em assuntos dos princípios da 
navegação e das embarcações utilizadas. 
 A segunda parte analisa a época dos finais do século XVI e dos inícios do século 
XVII através de ângulos históricos, historiográficos e políticos. Caracterizado pelos 
seguintes eventos históricos, o discurso é separado em três fases: de 1595 até 1609 pela 
primeira viagem holandesa em águas asiáticas, as primeiras operações militares 
planeadas em águas moçambicanas (1604, 1607 e 1608) até às Tréguas de Doze Anos 
entre Portugal e os Países Baixos. Durante esse período (1609-1621) não se registaram 
perdas devido ao chamado corso neerlandês mas a Carreira da Índia, a ligação por meio 
marítimo entre Lisboa, a metrópole do império português e Goa, a capital do Estado da 
Índia, sofreu perdas pela navegação e comércio de uma nova companhia privada da 
Europa do norte, a Companhia Inglesa. Planos e tentativas para fundir as duas 
companhias privadas em apenas uma falharam mas, uma colaboração formal entre as 
companhias, através da constituição das chamadas frotas de defesa, impediu o 
prolongamento das tréguas entre os Portugueses e Holandeses procuradas pelos últimos. 
Entre 1621 e 1623, a última fase em análise, foram retomadas as operações militares 
planeadas no Índico Ocidental causando a perda de três naus portuguesas no ano de 
1622. Os desacordos entre ambas as companhias pela supremacia do comércio asiático, 
que resultaram no massacre holandês contra os ingleses estacionados na feitoria 
partilhada de Amboina em 1623, impediram a execução de um novo ataque das forças 
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combinadas em águas moçambicanas, contudo, parte da armada portuguesa de 1623, 
que invernava na Ilha de Moçambique, perdeu-se devido a uma tempestade em Janeiro 
de 1624. 
 O capítulo três “Underwater Archaeology” explica as formações geográficas 
subaquáticas do Canal de Moçambique focando-se em fatores hidrográficos e 
oceanográficos como baixos, correntes e bancos de areia, que condicionaram a 
navegação luso-asiática, apresentando seis vestígios arqueológicos subaquáticos, cinco 
da navegação portuguesa e um da navegação holandesa em águas moçambicanas, 
observados e parcialmente escavados pela Arqueonautas Worldwide, Arqueologia 
Subaquática S.A., uma companhia privada de arqueologia marítima. 
 Nos capítulos quatro e cinco, “Naus of the Carreira da Índia the first half of the 
17
th
 century” and “Monetary flows of the Portuguese outward bound armadas during the 
first quarter of the 17
th
 century”, a análise composta pelos métodos de pesquisa 
historiográfica e dados arqueológicos recolhidos, trata assuntos e questões da 
construção dos meios do transporte marítimo português, as naus, apresentando uma 
comparação entre as teorias da construção naval portuguesa e a reconstrução baseada 
em dois vestígios arqueológicos, a Nossa Senhora dos Mártires, que se perdeu em 1606 
perto de São Julião de Barra, Portugal, e a Nossa Senhora da Consolação, que se perdeu 
em 1608 perto da Ilha de Moçambique. Relativamente aos fluxos monetários das 
armadas de ida que transportavam não só o dinheiro e o cabedal destinados à compra de 
especiarias mas também o dinheiro destinado à administração do Estado da Índia, a 
dissertação não só mostra a quantidade de dinheiro enviado, como apresenta a dimensão 
do comércio luso-asiático com a dependência e procura de prata originada no Novo 
Mundo e transportado pelas armadas espanholas. O caso da perda de várias 
embarcações espanholas nas Caraíbas e a falta de moedas de prata, os reales, serve 
como exemplo para o processo de preparação da armada portuguesa da Carreira da 
Índia no ano seguinte. Incluído neste capítulo encontra-se uma estimativa da quantidade 
de cabedal da armada de 1622 que, até agora, nunca tinha sido apresentada por ausência 
de dados documentais explícitos. 
 Usando os factos conhecidos das investigações de historiadores nacionais e 
internacionais e, através de uma nova interpretação baseada em documentos 
contemporâneos à qual foi acrescentada a  componente de arqueologia naval e marítima, 
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a presente dissertação apresenta uma nova perspetiva relacionada com as causas e 
efeitos de naufrágios da Carreira da Índia em águas moçambicanas entre 1595 e 1623. 
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 Carreira da Índia, fluxos monetários, Canal de Moçambique, Nau, Naufrágios 
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Introduction 
 
The present thesis Shipwrecks of the “Carreira da Índia” (1595-1623) – Sources 
for the Study in Portuguese Maritime History aims to analyze the various factors which 
caused the losses of ships of the Portuguese-Asiatic trade during the historical time 
period of the Union of the Two Iberian Crowns (1580-1640) and the first quarter of the 
17
th
 century in Mozambican waters, in particular.  
Structured into five main parts in which the first provides a generic overview of 
the development of the Portuguese Estado da Índia until the late 16
th
 century, the 
emergence of the European private companies, the Dutch United East India Company 
(VOC, founded in 1602), the British East India Company (EIC, founded in 1602) and 
the principles of the European-Asiatic shipping by observing the shipping routes and 
ships used.  
The second part analyses the era of the late 16
th
 century and the first quarter of 
the 17
th
 century from a more historical, political and historiographical point of view and 
is divided into three distinctive periods: 1595-1609, 1609-1621 and 1621-1623. This 
separation is based on the following historical events: the first voyage of a Dutch 
private company to Asia (1595), the Twelve Years Truce between the Portuguese and 
Dutch (1609-1621), the recurrence of naval combats in Asian waters (1621) of which 
the attack on the Portuguese outward bound fleet of 1622 symbolized the last planned, 
and combined, European military action in the Western Indian Ocean. Given the fact 
that the loss of ships of the Portuguese outward bound fleet of 1623 is directly related to 
the loss of the silver fleet in the Caribbean in the previous year, the analysis of the same 
was included in the present thesis. 
The third chapter, “Underwater Archaeology”, explains the geographical 
underwater formations of the Mozambique Channel focusing on hydrographical and 
oceanographic factors such as currents, sandbanks and shoals which conditioned the 
Portuguese-Asiatic shipping. Included in the presentation are the remains of six, five 
Portuguese and one Dutch, shipwrecks which were surveyed and in some cases 
excavated by Arqueonautas Worldwide, Arqueologia Subaquática S.A., a private 
marine archaeology company. 
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Chapters four and five, “Naus of the Carreira da Índia the first half of the 17th 
century” and “Monetary flows of the Portuguese outward bound armadas during the 
first quarter of the 17
th
 century”, a combined analysis of historiography and maritime as 
well as underwater archaeology deal with the construction of the means of Portuguese 
maritime transport and the nau in particular, as well as monetary flows of the outward 
bound fleets which, on one hand carried the annual money to buy spices and oriental 
goods and, on the other, the financial supplies for Estado da Índia. 
Given the fact that the European struggle for supremacy in world trade was not 
only fought in European waters or in the regions where spices and oriental goods 
originated from, such as the Spice Islands, but also took place at strategic points along 
the cape route, the maritime trade route to India, the present study focuses on one 
specific area in particular: Mozambique Island, the Portuguese way-station and entrepôt 
situated at the northern end of the Mozambique Channel which separates the island of 
Madagascar (or São Lourenço as it was named in the historical time period) from the 
African continent. The emphasis on this geographical area of the Western Indian Ocean 
is also based on the factor that approximately 25% of all known and documented 
shipwrecks of the Portuguese Carreira da Índia have occurred when passing the 
channel. 
Analyzing known facts and introducing recent investigations, the thesis aims to 
contribute to early modern European maritime history by focusing on the means of 
maritime transport and the merchandise transported on board. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
State of the Art 
 
 Shipwrecks as sources for Maritime History are not an invention of 
present day’s studies. In his book History of Africa South of the Zambesi, George 
McCall Theal refers to the importance of shipwrecks for Maritime History as 
“Knowledge derived from Shipwrecks”1. 
During the last decades, there has been a development towards a combined 
observation, in which Maritime or Underwater Archaeology is used to find answers for 
questions more related to Maritime History. Recent Portuguese and international studies 
in shipbuilding treaties such as The Nau of the Livro Nautico: Reconstructing a 
Sixteenth-Century Indiaman from Texts by Alexander Dean Hazlett (Texas A&M 
University, 2007), The History and Development of Caravels by George Robert 
Schwarz (Texas A&M University, 2008), Os Navios do Mar Oceano – Teoria e empiria 
na arquitectura naval portuguesa dos séculos XVI e XVII by Francisco Contente 
Domingues (Faculty of Letters, Lisbon University, 2004) or O Livro da fábrica das 
Naos de Fernando Oliveira. Princípios e Procedimentos de Construção Naval by 
Carlos Manuel Montalvão de Sousa (Faculty of Letters, Lisbon University, 2009) 
provide new observations and knowledge about technical aspects on shipbuilding 
treaties as well as questions like proportions, rigging or seaworthiness.  
 Recently published researches on questions like the impacts of the Dutch attacks 
on the Portuguese East India Route, the Dutch-Portuguese struggle and naval combats 
for economical and political supremacy in the East, A Carreira da Índia e o Corso 
Neerlandês:  1595-1625 by André Murteira (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2006), The 
Singapore and Melakka Straits: Violence, Security and Diplomacy in the 17
th
 Century 
(Singapore, 2010) and Hugo Grotius, the Portuguese and Free Trade in the East Indies 
(Singapore, 2011) by Peter Borschberg. Recent investigations in Dutch archives 
revealed new possible views on information obtained by the capture of several letters 
carried onboard of a Portuguese East Indiaman off Ilheus Queimados in 1606, shortly 
before the tentative siege off Mozambique island (1607-1608). 
                                                          
1
 See: George McCall Theal, History of Africa South of the Zambesi: From the Settlement of the 
Portuguese at Sofala in September 1505 to the Conquest of the Cape Colony by the British in September 
1795, vol.I, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1916, pp. 303-330. 
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 Research investigation of the wood structure of an early 17
th
 century Portuguese 
East Indiaman wrecked off São Julião de Barra, Lisbon, Portugal, believed to be the 
Nossa Senhora dos Mártires which sunk on its homeward bound journey in 1606, 
enabled the first virtual reconstruction of a Portuguese nau based on archival research 
on technical manuscripts of shipbuilding as well as recovered and measured artefacts. 
Filipe Castro, director of the excavation campaigns of the Nossa Senhora dos Mártires, 
published his research in several scientific articles, books and as his PhD thesis at the 
Texas A&M University: The Pepper Wreck, A Portuguese Indiaman at the mouth of the 
Tagus river (Texas A/&M University, College Station, 2001), A Nau de Portugal – Os 
navios da conquista do Império do Oriente 1498-1650 (Lisbon, 2003) as well as 
Rigging the Pepper Wreck. Part 1-Masts and Yards (Malden, Oxford, 2007) and 
Rigging the Pepper Wreck. Part 2-Sails (Malden, Oxford, 2009), among others. In 
2006, Filipe Castro (in collaboration with Katie Custer) organized the Symposium 
“Edge of Empire”, which communications especially dealt with the history of Iberian 
seafaring and shipbuilding. 
 Introducing new information from an investigation of an early 17
th
 century 
Portuguese nau, which sunk off Mozambique Island in 1608 and believed to be the 
Nossa Senhora da Consolação, allows, for the first time, to observe and compare data 
on 17
th
 century Portuguese shipbuilding, proportions and general reconstruction of the 
two first documented findings of the same type of ship. The discovery of Spanish reales 
in Mozambican waters, believed to belong to the São José, which sunk in consequence 
of the combined Anglo-Dutch attack of the 1622 outward bound fleet off Mogincual 
shoal in 1622, combined with the losses of three Spanish Galleons off Florida the same 
year and the historical documentation of money supply for the Portuguese Estado da 
Índia under the Union of the Two Iberian Crowns (1580-1640) not only enables a 
numismatic analysis of the monetary flow but also the global impact of silver coins 
from the New World send to Europe and Asia during the first half of the 17
th
 century. 
Studies in Portuguese and International Maritime or Underwater Archaeology 
either deal separately with the remains of ships, such as the wood structure, or with 
artefacts. A combined analysis of the means of maritime transportation and the goods 
transported by these is rare. In his book Looking for Leads: Shipwrecks of the past 
revealed by contemporary documents and archaeological record, a research regarding 
the Baltic Sea published in 1997, Christian Ahlström presented “a series of case studies 
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that illustrate how maritime archaeology and history offer insights into our 
understanding of past political, economic and societal patterns” 2, a methodology of 
angles for research and investigation was applied for the elaboration of the present 
thesis on Portuguese-Asiatic shipping and shipwrecks of the Carreira da Índia in 
particular. 
By using the methods of two different sciences, Underwater Archaeology and 
History, the present thesis aims to provide a wider view of historical events which 
occurred during the Union of the Two Iberian Crowns and an uprising European 
struggle for the East India trade. Therefore, the analysis and comparison of archival 
documentation with archaeological records of Portuguese ships during the first half of 
the 17
th
 century will demonstrate how contemporary sources as well as archaeological 
records correspond to each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 See: Stefan H. Claesson, “Book Review: Looking for Leads: Shipwrecks of the Past Revealed by 
Contemporary Documents and the Archaeological Record by Christian Ahlstrom”, in Northeast Historical 
Archaeology, [s.l.], [s.n.], vol. 26.1, 1997, pp. 89-90. 
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I Historical background 
 
I.1 The Portuguese Estado da Índia 
1497-1580 
 
Before the arrival of the Portuguese, and later, other European maritime or 
seaborne empires, maritime trade in Asia was undertaken by several local seafaring 
people such as the Arakanese, the Chinese, the Javanese or the Malayans, organized in 
“a network of maritime trade routes linking the ports of departure and call, the termini 
and stapling points for the merchandise coming from the various production areas”3. 
Soon after the first voyages to the East Indies initiated by the voyage of 
discovery of the maritime trade route to India by Vasco da Gama (1497-1499), Portugal 
had established its sphere of political influence in the Asiatic world by the foundation of 
the Portuguese Cochin based Estado da Índia in 1505
4
 and the conquest of Melakka by 
Afonso de Albuquerque in 1511, and expanded its commerce by creating a complex 
network “by occupying a number of strategic points which, once fortified, could easily 
be defended from the sea by armed men-of-war”5. Characterized as a “political sea 
power with an economic goal supported by a commercial organization”6 by alliances 
and privileges of local authorities “operating from one central point and from one 
central port of loading which linked both western and eastern Asia and therefore made 
centralized inter-Asian trade possible“7, the Estado da Índia became a model, which 
was copied and adopted by the Dutch East India Company almost a century later
8
.  
 The centralized maritime trade in Asia aimed at a monopolization of the spice 
trade and commerce with precious oriental goods, which profits obtained by the 
                                                          
3
 See: M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago 
between 1500 and about 1630, The Hague, Martinus Nijnhoff, 1963, p. 118. 
4
 See: “Estado da Índia”, in Luís de Albuquerque (dir.), Francisco Contente Domingues (ed.), Dicionário 
de História dos Descobrimentos Portugueses, Lisbon, Círculo de Leitores, 1994, vol. I, p. 390. 
5
 See: M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, op. cit., p. 116. 
6
 See: Idem, p. 119. 
7
 See: Idem, ibidem. 
8
 See: Idem, p. 120. 
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Portuguese caused a European struggle for participation and even overtaking by military 
force. 
 
 
 
I.2 Portuguese Estado da Índia, the British East India 
Company and the Dutch United East India Company    
during the first half of the 17
th
 century 
 
 The first half of the seventeenth century is characterized by various historical 
events whose impacts changed the established world known until then. By the end of 
the previous century, the Habsburg Empire ruled over the Netherlands which entered 
into their struggle of independence against the Spanish crown in 1568
9
.  
The unification of the two Iberian crowns, result of Cardinal Henry’s death in 
1580 and the acclamation of King Philip II of Spain as King Philip I of Portugal
10
 in the 
same year proved to be an important part of the political explanation why the Dutch had 
started to attack Portuguese overseas possessions in West and East Africa, Asia and 
Brazil by the end of the century. Furthermore, the Spanish king had introduced a law by 
which foreign trade or shipping in Iberian territorial waters, ports and overseas 
territories in Angola, Guinea, Principe and S. Tomé on the western African shores, 
Brazil and the Caribbean on the western Atlantic trade or any Iberian possessions in the 
Indian Ocean and Asian waters
11
 was forbidden.  
The embargo and the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty
12
, aimed to weaken the Dutch 
economic position by excluding merchants from the Lisbon spice market, resulted in the 
                                                          
9
 See: Charles Ralph Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, Manchester, Carcanet, 1991, p. 107. 
10
 See: Idem, pp. 108, f. 
11
 See: Julio Firmino Judice Biker (ed.), Collecção de Tratados e concertos de pazes que o Estado da 
Índia Portugueza fez com os Reis e Senhores com quem teve relações nas partes da Ásia e África 
Oriental desde o princípio da conquista até ao fim do século XVII, Lisbon, Imprensa Nacional, 1884, t. 
IV,, pp. 73, ff. 
12
 See: Jonathan I. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade 1585-1740, Oxford, Clarendon, 2010, p. 82. 
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foundation of several Holland and Zeeland based overseas companies which, at the turn 
of the century, took over the Portuguese shipping monopole with Asiatic and Oriental 
goods bound for the European market
13
, but also created an atmosphere of inner Dutch 
rivalry, which was resolved by the creation of a joint stock company of the East Indian 
trade: The Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) or the United East India 
Company in 1602
14
 which purposes were not only to enable a Dutch East India trade but 
also to attack and conquer Portuguese and Spanish overseas possessions in Asia
15
 such 
as Mozambique island, an important entrepôt and way-station on the eastern African 
shores, Amboina, Melakka, Ternate, Tidore and the Moluccas as well as Portuguese-
Asiatic shipping.  
During the course of the thesis, the history of the Portuguese-Dutch conflict, 
later also extended to the English during the first half of the seventeenth century, is 
divided into three distinctive periods, each one observed and analyzed in detail. The 
first, from 1595 to 1609 is characterized by the first overseas encounters of Portuguese 
ships of the Carreira da Índia and the Dutch East India companies, including the VOC, 
which, were more of an accidental nature than of planned attacks
16
. Starting with the 
Dutch expedition in the Western Indian Ocean in 1604 led by Admiral Steven van der 
Hagen, the Dutch strategy changed towards a more offensive operation against the 
Portuguese overseas possessions and shipping, as well as their allies,
17
 including the 
blockades of Goa, Lisbon and Melakka, the capture of the Portuguese ship Santa 
Catarina (1603), the losses of the Portuguese ships Santiago (1602), Nossa Senhora do 
Loreto (1606), Nossa Senhora da Consolação (1608), Bom Jesus (1608), the Dutch ship 
Zierikzee (1608) as well as the tentative conquest of Mozambique island in 1607 and 
1608 and the conquest of the Spice islands, the Moluccas.  
The following years, from 1609 to 1621, were a relatively peaceful momentum, 
due to the ratification of the Twelve Years Truce and during which the Spanish 
acknowledged the independence of the Netherlands provinces from the Habsburg 
Empire. The Portuguese Estado da Índia in its limited possibilities caused by the 
                                                          
13
 See: Idem, p. 68. 
14
 See Idem, pp. 69, ff. 
15
 See: Idem: pp. 71, ff; Charles Ralph Boxer, op. cit., pp.. 109, ff. 
16
 See: André Murteira, A Carreira da Índia e o Corso Neerlandês, 1595-1625, Lisbon, Tribuna, 2012,p 
pp. 62-94. 
17
 See: Idem, pp.. 97, f; Cf: N. Mac Leod, De Oost-Indische Compagnie als Zeemogendheid in Azie, 
Rijswick, Blankwaardt & Schoonhoven, vol. I, 1927, pp. 20- 58, f, 65. 
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unification of the two Iberian crowns, managed to regain parts of its annual trade with 
the Far East. Also, the embargo of Dutch-Iberian shipping was lifted benefiting both 
sides.  
On the other side, the VOC expanded its economic network and alliances in the 
Asiatic World such as the Johor-VOC alliance
18
 and the economic relationships with the 
Kingdom of Jambi in southern Sumatra, the establishment of the Dutch East India 
Company in Batavia (Jakarta) in 1621
19
, but also the construction of several 
fortifications on the Moluccas
20
 and Pulicat, of which the later was only one of the 
friction points regarding the Dutch-Portuguese struggle of the Asian cotton and spice 
trade monopole
21
 as well as the general European supremacy, including the struggles 
between the British East India Company (EIC), founded in 1600
22
, and the VOC. 
Although attempts had been made to reach an Anglo-Dutch agreement regarding the 
Asian spice trade in 1613 and 1615
23
, a merger of the two companies was rejected by 
both parties. The Dutch scholar-politician Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) defended the right 
of free trade and that “the seas were opened to all”24, published with the title Mare 
Libertum in 1609
25
. The arguments presented by Grotius and defended against the 
Portuguese claims for the domination of the trade in the East Indies by the Dutch State-
generals and the general-council of the VOC, the Herren XVII, was neglected towards 
the English
26
. Nevertheless, a “Treaty of Defense” against the Spanish and Portuguese 
(1619-1623) was concluded but was also overshadowed by several conflicts in the 
Indonesian Archipelago region. 
Growing English interests in the raw silk trade with the Persian Shah Abbas, 
who had extended his sphere of influence into the Persian Gulf region formed the basis 
for the Anglo-Persian merge of interests but also meant a new momentum challenging 
the Portuguese East India trade and Ormus at its outer borders at the entry towards the 
                                                          
18
 See: Peter Borschberg, The Johor-VOC alliance and the Twelve Years’ Truce: Factualism, Intrigue and 
International Diplomacy C.1606-1613, Singapore, [s.n.], 2009. 
19
 See: Peter Borschberg, The Singapore and Melakka Straits; Violence, Security and Diplomacy in the 
17
th
 Century, Singapore, NUS Press, 2010, p. 122. 
20
 See: Jonathan I. Israel, op. cit., pp. 101-105. 
21
 See: Idem, ibidem. 
22
 See: John Keay, The honorable company: a history of the English East India Company, London, 
Harper Collins, 1993, p. 9. 
23
 See: Jonathan I. Israel, op. cit., pp. 104, f. 
24
 See: Idem: p. 104. 
25
 See: Peter Borschberg, Hugo Grotius, the Portuguese and Free Trade in the East Indies, Singapore, 
NUS Press, 2011, with special regard to the principles of free trade: pp. 84-88. 
26
 See: Jonathan I. Israel, op. cit., pp. 104, f. 
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Persian Gulf. European collaboration with local kings and authorities, the Portuguese 
supporting the interests of Ormus, the English the ones of the Persians, created a hostile 
environment and the conquest of Ormus by the Anglo-Persian forces in 1622. 
Apart from the loss of the VOC ship Witte Leeuw, caused by a naval combat 
with ships of the Carreira da Índia in 1613, there has been no loss of ships on both 
sides as observed above
27
 and regarding the Anglo-Portuguese encounters, only the 
1613 Nossa Senhora da Nazaré and the 1616 São Julião incidents are reported. 
 As the treaty of Antwerp, the Twelve Years Truce, ended without a 
prolongation or signing of a new treaty, the Dutch-Portuguese conflict was relaunched 
by an intensified military strategy to confirm and extend the Dutch economic and 
political pre-eminency compared to the Estado da Índia in Asia
28
. After a joined Anglo-
Dutch attack on the 1622 armada led by the Vice-king D. Francisco da Gama, which 
resulted in the losses of the S. José off Mozambique and the subsequent losses of the S. 
Carlos and the S. Teresa at Mozambique island
29
, the Dutch concentrated their forces 
on the Asian seas rather than on the Indian Ocean by capturing several Portuguese ships 
of the China-Goa route between 1630 and 1644, the struggle to capture Melakka 
between 1633 and 1641
30
 as well as several blockades of Goa
31
 of which the final 
blockade of 1644 resulted in the provisionary peace treaty between the VOC and 
Portugal
32
 which had gained its independence from Spain in 1640. Also, the VOC 
launched several fleets towards the Philippines to attack the Spanish trans-oceanic 
galleons of the Manila-Acapulco route
33
 as there has been a shortage of silver supply for 
the purchase of goods due to the increased costs of war efforts
34
.  
                                                          
27
 See. André Murteira, op. cit., pp. 153-159. 
28
 See: Peter Borschberg, op. cit., p. 165. 
29
 See: Charles Ralph Boxer, Dom Francisco da Gama, Conde de Vidigueira e a sua viagem à Índia no 
ano de 1622, Lisboa, Anais Clube Militar Naval, vol. 5-6, Lisbon, Imprensa da Marinha, 1930. 
30
 See: Peter Borschberg, op. cit., pp.. 165, f, 183-188. 
31
 See: Idem, ibidem, pp. 166, 175. 
32
 See: Julio Firmino Judice Biker (ed.), Collecção de Tratados e concertos de pazes que o Estado da 
Índia Portugueza fez com os Reis e Senhores com quem teve relações nas partes da Asia e Africa 
Oriental desde o princípio da conquista até ao fim do seculo XVIII, vol. II, Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional, 
1882, 138, ff; José Ferreira Borges de Castro, Collecção de Tratados, Convenções, Contratos e Actos 
Publicos celebrados entre a Coroa de Portugal e as mais Potencias desde 1640 até ao presente, vol. I, 
Lisbon, Imprensa Nacional, 1856, pp.. 24, ff. 
33
 See: N. Mac Leod, op. cit., pp. 359, ff. 
34
 See: Jonathan I. Israel, op. cit., p. 171. 
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The 1630 treaty of Madrid
35
, extended to the sphere of the Portuguese Estado da 
Índia in 1635
36
, ended the Anglo-Portuguese and Anglo-Spanish animosities and led to 
a de-escalation in times of rising conflicts between the Dutch and the Portuguese in 
Asian waters. 
Generally speaking, the historic time period of the end of the 16
th
 until the mid 
17
th
 century is regarded as the decline of the Portuguese Estado da Índia and commerce 
in Asia as, at the same time, the Dutch East India Company’s operations as the golden 
age. The fact that the Dutch had lost part of its Mediterranean and Near East trade due 
to higher freight charges
37
 opened new possibilities for their East India Company
38
 as 
the reorganization of Dutch maritime trade after 1621, concentrated on the Asiatic and 
Trans-Atlantic trade routes.  
As stated above, silver was the major means of purchasing oriental goods and 
spices and during the Union of the two Iberian crowns, was supplied by the Spanish 
armadas of the New World
39
  but also minted in reales, the major currency in the 
Portuguese Estado da Índia
40
. The Spanish real-of-eight or piece-of-eight (the 
Portuguese pataca) was a standard coin used in the East India trade, equivalent to eight 
Dutch shilling
41
. After the arrival of the Spanish armadas, the money was transferred to 
the Lisbon India house, the Casa da Índia, from where it was distributed onto the fleets 
departing towards the East. 
 
 
 
                                                          
35
 See: José Ferreira Borges de Castro, op. cit., pp. 103-115. 
36
 See: Idem, pp. 102, f. 
37
 See: Idem, p. 150. 
38
 See: Idem, p. 171. 
39
 See: Alejandro Mirabal, Spanish coins in Mozambican Waters – The Numismatic Collection of the São 
Jose (1622), [s.l.], Arqueonautas Publications, 2013. 
40
 See: T. W. Baxter, A. da Silva Rego (eds.), Documentos sobre os Portugueses em Moçambique e na 
África Central: 1497-1840 – Documents on the Portuguese in Central Africa and Mozambique: 1497-
1840, Lisbon, Centro de História e Cartografia Antiga do Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical, 
1989, vol. IX, p. 180; Alejandro Mirabal, Idem, ibidem. 
41
 See: Kristof Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade: 1620-1740, The Hague, Martinus Nijnhoff, 1981, p. 50. 
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I.3 Comparing the principles of                         
Portuguese and Dutch-Asiatic shipping 
 
The annual Portuguese armadas linking Asia and Europe are known by the 
expression Carreira da Índia or Rota do Cabo
42
. Outward bound fleets usually left the 
metropolis Lisbon during April and May, passing the islands of Madeira and Cape 
Verde towards the Cape of Good Hope, entering the Indian Ocean and passing the 
Mozambique Channel, the inner-route between the African main land and the island of 
Madagascar
43
, towards Cochin and Goa. In these journeys ships usually stayed at 
Mozambique island to take refreshments, repairing purposes or to cure the sick at the 
local hospital
44
. The fortified possession at the northern end of the channel later gained 
importance to secure the local Portuguese East African trade against the Dutch attacks 
in 1607 and 1608 as well as in 1622. Homeward bound armadas left India around 
December and until January of the following year, usually taking the outer course off 
Madagascar and taking refreshments at the Azores before arriving in Lisbon 
midsummer, an average round voyage of almost 1.5 years
45
.  
Dutch-Asiatic shipping differed from the Portuguese armadas. Dutch ships fitted 
out several chambers such as Amsterdam, Delft or Zeeland left Northern Europe several 
times a year without a fixed calendar
46
, passing the Cape of Good Hope and the Indian 
Ocean on an outer course off Madagascar towards Batavia (Jakarta), the Dutch 
administrative headquarters in Asia which was founded in 1621
47
, but usually returned 
per annum departing from Batavia between December and February of the following 
year
48
.  
                                                          
42
 For a general observation of the Portuguese-India navigation see: Francisco Contente Domingues, A 
Carreira da Índia, Lisbon, Clube do Coleccionador dos Correios, 1998; Roteiros Portugueses Inéditos da 
Carreira da Índia do século XVI, Lisbon, Agência Geral das Colónias, 1940. 
43
 The island of Madagascar was known as S. Lourenço.; See Francisco Contente Domingues, Idem, p. 8. 
44
 See: Charles Ralph Boxer, Moçambique island and the carreira da Índia, STVDIA-Revista Semetral, 
n
0
 8, July 1961, Lisbon, 1961, pp.. 99, ff. 
45
 See: André Murteira, op. cit., p. 26. 
46
 See: R. Bruijn, F. S. Gaastra, I. Schöffer (eds.), Dutch-Asiatic Shipping in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries, 
The Hague, Martinus Nijnhof, 1979-1987, vol. II, pp. 56, f, 73, ff. 
47
 See: R. Bruijn, F. S. Gaastra, I. Schöffer (eds.), op. cit., vol. III, pp.. 26, ff. 
48
 See: Peter Borschberg, The Singapore and Melakka Straits; Violence, Security and Diplomacy in the 
17
th
 Century, Singapore, NUS Press, 2010, p. 122; For a general observation of the Dutch-Asiatic 
navigation see: R. Bruijn, F. S. Gaastra, I. Schöffer (eds.), op. cit., vol. I, pp. 56-92. 
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The Dutch colony at the Cape of Good Hope was founded in 1652
49
 and 
represented an important way-station for outward and homeward bound fleets.  
The principles of European-Asiatic navigation from which the Portuguese had 
gained their experience during the 16
th
 century were a vital factor for the fast rise of the 
Dutch East India Company. In fact, the experiences of Jan Hyugen van Linschoten 
(1562/3-1611) who had lived five years in Goa
50
 and published as Reysgheschrift van de 
navigation der Portugaloysers in 1595
51
 became a kind of pilot of sailing instructions 
for the first Dutch East India voyage of de Houtman in 1595
52
. The participation of 
foreign seafarers, soldiers or passengers on board of Portuguese ships, a common 
practice since the early days of the Carreira da Índia, was abolished by the decree of 
King Philip I of Portugal in 1594 and renewed under his successor, Philip II in 1606
53
, a 
fact which can be linked to the espionage of Linschoten.  
On the other hand, this prohibition implied a limitation of mariners and soldiers 
by their origins and nationalities which, in times of economical and political changes 
and warfare meant a shortage of human resources for the Portuguese. Compared with 
the principles of the VOC, which throughout its existence not only based its operations 
on Dutch mariners and soldiers but also, and most probably, merely on foreigners like 
Danish, Germans and other Northern and Central European regions, the restriction also 
played an important role. 
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 See. Charles Ralph Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, op. cit., p. 111. 
50
 See: H. Houwens Post, “João Huygen van Linschoten: Administrador da casa do Arcebispo de Goa e 
Espião da Holanda (1583-1587)”,  sep. Ocidente, vol. 58, pp. 123-130; R. Bruijn, F. S. Gaastra, I. 
Schöffer (eds.), Idem, p. 59. 
51
 See: R. Bruijn, F. S. Gaastra, I. Schöffer (eds.), Idem, ibidem. 
52
 See: Idem, ibidem; J. L. Mollema, „De erste Schifvaart der Hollanders Oost-Indie 1595-1597“, The 
Hague, Martinus Nijnhoff, 1938. 
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 See: Julio Firmino Judice Biker (ed.), Idem, ibidem. 
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Figure 1: “The Portuguese India Route”54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
54
 See: Filipe Castro, Nuno Fonseca, “Sailing the Pepper Wreck”: a Proposed Methodology for 
Understanding an Early 17
th
-Century Portuguese Indiaman”, in The International Journal of Nautical 
Archaeology, ed. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Malden, Oxford, 2006, vol. 35.1, p. 98. 
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I.4 Ships of the Portuguese Carreira da Índia and  
of the Dutch United East India Company 
 
 Since the beginning, East Indiamen formed the core of the fleets from the 
Portuguese Carreira da India
55
 , the Dutch
56
 and the English East India Companies. 
Portuguese ships were mostly naus or carracks
57
 whereas spiegelschepen or square stern 
ships
58
 as well as Fluyts or Flyboats were Dutch, neither denoting “a special type of 
ship, but the particular use made of a certain type of ship”59. During the course of the 
first half of the 17
th
 century, both Portuguese and Dutch shipbuilding were subjected to 
changes in design, the experimental phase of three or four deck naus or the introduction 
of the Dutch Fluyt
60
, which, compared to the spiegelschepen, differed by their extended 
length and shorter draught as well as lower costs of maintenance and a higher capacity 
of transporting cargo and less human resources needed for the navigation. During the 
course of the 17
th
 century, the Fluyts became the preferred Dutch East Indiamen and 
ultimately replaced the spiegelschepen. 
                                                          
55
 See: “Nau”, in Luís de Albuquerque (dir.), Francisco Contente Domingues (coord.), Dicionário de 
História dos Descobrimentos Portugueses, Lisbon, Círculo de Leitores, 1994, vol. II, p. 792; Francisco 
Contente Domingues, Os Navios do Mar Oceano – Teoria e impiria na arquitectura naval portuguesa 
dos séculos XVI e XVII, Lisbon, Centro de História, 2004, pp. 243-252; Filipe Vieira de Castro, “Navios 
de vela”, in Francisco Contente Domingues (ed.), História da Marinha Portuguesa. Navios, Marinheiros 
e Arte de Navegar 1500-1661, Lisbon, Academia de Marinha, 2012, pp. 60-63. 
56
 See: R. Bruijn, F. S. Gaastra, I. Schöffer (eds.), op. cit., vol. I, p. 38. 
57
 See: Alex Hazlett, “The Nau of the Livro Náutico: The Textual Excavation of a Portuguese Indiaman”, 
in Edge of Empire – Proceedings of the Simposium “Edge of Empire” held at the 2006 Annual Meeting of 
the Society for Historical Archaeology Sacramento CA (Filipe Castro, Katie Custer (eds.), Casal de 
Cambra, Caleidoscópio, 2008. 
58
 See: R. Bruijn, F. S. Gaastra, I. Schöffer (eds.), Idem, ibidem. 
59
 See: Idem, ibidem; André Murteira, op. cit., pp. 30-35. 
60
 See: “Fleute”, in Alfred Dudszus, Ernest Henriot, Friedrich Krumrey (eds.), Das grosse Buch der 
Schiffstypen – Schiffe, Boote, Flöße unter Riemen und Segel, Historische Schiffs- und Bootsfunde, 
Berühmte Segelschiffe, 3
rd
 edition, Berlin, transpress VEB Verlag für Verkehrswesen, 1988, pp. 103-105. 
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Both naus and spiegelschepen were three masted ships of almost 40m in length 
and approximately 10 to 13m in beam
61
 which results in an average proportion of length 
to beam of 3/1. Also, a general comparison of the water displacement of a Portuguese 
nau of a capacity of 500t and an East Indiama show similar characteristics: an average 
of 1000 to 1200t
62
. Also, East Indiaman, either the Portuguese or European were armed 
merchantmen, a vessel mainly used for commercial purposes equipped with artillery for 
defensive rather than offensive military intendment.  
 But the ships differed in several key aspects of their construction which 
ultimately affected their navigation and performance. The Portuguese naus, during the 
historical time period investigated in this thesis, are described as large vessels of three 
or four decks and a draught of up to 10m. Dutch spiegelschepen were, as the East 
Indiamen in general, a vessel of maximum two decks with a draught smaller than the 
Portuguese naus.   
The naus had a castle on both parts, the prow and the stern, the spiegelshepen 
only at their stern, which, by its flat shape also called “spiegel” (mirror) differed from 
the naus. Also, the process of the hull construction differed due to the historical 
development of shipbuilding. While the Portuguese and Spanish followed the 
Mediterranean tradition of the carvel-built or skeleton-first method of carvel-planking, 
Dutch, and generally speaking Central and Northern European, shipbuilding was based 
on the shell-first method of an overlapping planking, also known as clinker-planking. 
Both the Portuguese and Dutch used other types of ships for the European-
Asiatic voyages as well, the galleons and jachten. 
Generally speaking, Portuguese Galleons were four masted vessels, similar to 
the appearance of naus, but mainly used for military purposes
63
 such as accompanying 
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 See: Luís Filipe Monteiro Vieira de Castro, The Pepper Wreck: A Portuguese Indiaman at the mouth of 
the Tagus river, PhD Thesis, Texas A&M University, College Station, 2001, p. 193; “Ostindienfahrer”, in 
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edition, Berlin, transpress VEB Verlag für Verkehrswesen, 1988, p. 195. 
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 See: Luís Filipe Monteiro Vieira de Castro, op. cit., p. 187; “Ostindienfahrer”, Idem, ibidem. 
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the convoys of naus to India or in the Asian waters itself. Differing by its construction 
characteristics, the Galleon had a shorter draught than the three or four deck naus
64
 and 
also differed from them by the amount of its armament. 
Dutch jachten (plural of jacht) were small vessels used for transmitting 
dispatches, reconnaissance or accompanying the merchant ships, the retourschepen or 
fluyts
65
.  
Still, at the beginning of the 17
th
 century there has been no distinctive separation 
and classification between types of ships based on their use as a merchant ship or 
warship and Indiamen, either Dutch, English or Portuguese, were bifunctional sailing 
ships which, as single operating vessel or composed in fleets, were the means of 
communication and execution of economic, military or political strategies of a company 
or empire linking its metropolis and branch headquarters, factories, strategic costal 
defense positions and trade posts by using maritime routes. 
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II Shipwrecks of the Carreira da Índia 
1595-1623 
 
By the end of the 16
th
 and beginning of the 17
th
 century, Portuguese and Spanish 
colonial possessions were scattered around the globe. As Charles Ralph Boxer had 
pointed out, the Dutch offensive military operations were mainly directed against the 
Portuguese overseas empire than against the Spanish
66
. Either observed as struggle for 
free trade or supremacy for the East Indies trade, or as defense of an empire established 
by the voyages of Discoveries and ratified by the pope, the treaty of Tordesillas, the 
investigation of the thesis Shipwrecks of the “Carreira da Índia” (1595-1623) – 
Sources for the Study in Portuguese Maritime History will rather be conducted and 
concentrated on the Indian Ocean and the Mozambique channel in particular. 
Although the Dutch and combined Anglo-Dutch attacks on Portuguese 
navigation on the Cape route during the first half of the seventeenth century had its 
impact disturbing the regular annual shipment between Asia and Europe, the same had 
already been affected by losses due to piracy and attacks in the Atlantic during the 16
th
 
century
67
 but also due to navigation, weather or other causes
68
. Nevertheless, each loss 
or even a delay due to a late entering of the Indian Ocean and a mandatory wintering at 
Mozambique Island consequently meant problems for a fragile overseas possession, the 
Estado da Índia. As the Portuguese financial system was based on the profits of the 
overseas trade exportations into Europe such as goods from the Atlantic (West Africa 
and Brazil) as well as the spices and oriental goods carried onboard of the East 
Indiamen, the Estado da Índia depended on the annual supply of the Asiatic trade 
remittance from the metropolis which was directly re-invested in the outfitting of the 
next years’ fleet69 and in purchasing new pepper. The Union of the Iberian crowns and 
the uprising of the European concurrence of the Asiatic trade at the beginning of the 17
th
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century had several impacts on the Portuguese Empire such as the subvention of the 
Spanish war in Flanders
70
, the construction, repair and reinforcement of coastal 
fortifications in West and East Africa as well as in Asia, an expense which had shifted 
from being an extraordinary cost into a constant one.
71
 The impact of the blockades of 
Lisbon harbor in 1606, hindering the departure of the annual Portuguese East India 
fleet
72
, the loss of the Nossa Senhora dos Mártires at São Julião de Barra near the river 
mouth of the Tagus river near Lisbon in 1606
73
, the loss of the oriental goods, and the 
losses of the São Francisco in 1607 and Nossa Senhora da Consolação in 1608 caused 
by the tentative Dutch sieges off Mozambique Island, both carrying the remittance of a 
total of 40,000 cruzados to purchase pepper and other oriental goods
74
 are examples of 
the impact on the Portuguese.  
Although the period of the Twelve Years Truce suggested a stabilization 
regarding the military operations, the internal Portuguese administrative problems, 
namely the borrowing of the king’s pepper money and corruption in the Estado da 
Índia, but also the low prices of spices and oriental goods at the European market due to 
the importations by the Dutch and English
75
 are seen as causes for the modest or non 
existing recovery of the Portuguese East India trade
76
. 
The end of the Twelve Years Truce in 1621 and the renewal of the Dutch-
Portuguese struggle collide with the war efforts in the Persian Gulf in 1622 and the fall 
of the important Portuguese trade post in Ormus by a combined Anglo-Persian force
77
.  
A year later, a joint Anglo-Dutch fleet attacked the Portuguese East India fleet 
off Mozambique which resulted not only in the hindering of the supplies needed in 
Persia but also in the losses of three ships, The São Carlos, the São José and the Santa 
Teresa. 
Resuming the losses of Portuguese ships of the Carreira da Índia during the first 
half of the seventeenth century, either caused by enemies’ attacks or other 
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circumstances, the impacts, on a long term view, seem to be quite small. As a matter of 
fact, the Carreira da Índia continued its annual shipment from and towards India but 
the annual shipment was slowed down or sometimes blocked by the efforts of the 
European enemies. Some losses, especially the Nossa Senhora dos Mártires, São 
Francisco and the Nossa Senhora da Consolação (1606-1608), the S. Carlos, S. José 
and Santa Teresa (1622) and the S. Bráz, S. Simão and Santa Isabel (1623) occurred at 
weak points of the Portuguese Estado da Índia. 
 
 
 
II.1 From naval conflicts to the Twelve Years Truce 
1600-1609 
 
 During the first decade of the 17
th
 century, the relationships between the Dutch 
and Portuguese were characterized by the struggle for supremacy in European-Asiatic 
trade, either seen as the defense of the exclusive right by the treaty of Tordesillas in 
1494
78
 by the Portuguese, or as the necessity to open and guarantee access to free 
navigation and trade, ports and merchandize by military force, from the Dutch point of 
view. 
 Not only the neglected access to trade with oriental goods and spices by the 
royal decrees and embargos of 1594 and 1598
79
 but also the possibility to obtain silver 
coins, (the Spanish reales and the 1 reales de peso de a ocho, a single coin of an 
average of 26g of silver, in particular, was considered a stable currency at the Iberian 
markets), were factors indicating economic reasons for the shifting of Dutch-Asiatic 
policies. 
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The instructions of the Dutch fleet which left Northern Europe under the 
command of Steven van der Hagen in December 1603 clearly stated the attack of 
Portuguese or Castilian possessions or shipping as well as of their allies
80
. However, the 
decision of an offensive strategy was based on several factors: after the established 
commercial and political relationships with several Asian kingdoms, such as Johore, the 
Portuguese had been attacking Dutch-Asiatic ships and trade in the vicinities of the 
Spice Islands such as Amboina, Bantam or Java
81
 . Also, the captures of the Portuguese 
ship Santa Catarina
82
, a Nnu, which laden with merchandize from China en route to 
Goa was seized in the Singapore Straits in 1603 and caused a diplomatic incident
83
 
should rather be seen as minor incidents than the bigger operations which unfolded 
shortly after. Two years later, the Dutch managed to capture the Santo António off 
Patani and actually kept the ship for their trade purposes
84
, modified its physical 
appearance
85
 and tried to include her in the homeward bound fleet of 1606
86
. 
 The first blockade and attempt of conquering Mozambique Island was 
undertaken by the fleet under the command of Steven van der Hagen in June-August 
1604
87
. Due to a late departure of the Portuguese outward bound East India fleet in 1604 
under the command of D. Martim Afonso de Castro
88
, the attempted conquest of 
Portuguese ships off Mozambique only resulted in the capture of the annual ship of the 
Goa-Mozambique trade, the Nau de trato
89
. The departure of van der Hagen’s fleet of 
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twelve ships
90
 from Mozambique towards Goa in mid August permitted that the delayed 
Portuguese fleet did not suffer an earlier attack as in 1607 in the said region, but one 
ship, the nau São Filipe under the command of António de Mendonça was lost at 
Angoxa
91
, a distance of 30 léguas off Mozambique Island
92
, of which the Portuguese 
managed to save all hands, the cabedal, the Kings money, the artillery and some other 
cargo
93
. The Portuguese had managed to defend Mozambique Island, their important 
way-station for the Carreira da Índia shipping but had to become aware of the 
possibility of another attempt. 
 During the next years Dutch military campaigns under the command of Willem 
de Zoete van Haultain, planned in 1605 and executed in 1606, aimed at a blockade and 
crusade of Iberian, mainly Portuguese, shipping in European waters
94
, which, caused by 
delayed preparations, resulted in a hindering of the departure of the Portuguese East 
India fleet
95
 of the same year and the seizure of some ships at the river-mouth of the 
Tagus river, Lisbon, Portugal
96
. After his return to the United Provinces, Haultain was 
appointed commander of the second expedition of the same nature which did not result 
in success. Like the loss of the S. Filipe off Mozambique, the losses of the Nossa 
Senhora da Salvação and Nossa Senhora dos Mártires, ships of the 1606 Portuguese 
homeward bound fleet
97
, were not direct results of Dutch operations.  Although the 
Portuguese managed to save all hands and cargo on board of the Nossa Senhora da 
Salvação at the beach of Cascais
98
, north of the river-mouth of the Tagus river, the same 
cannot be said for the Nossa Senhora dos Mártires, lost in the vicinities of the São 
Julião de Barra fortress
99
, which due to its excavated wood structure which was 
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preserved in a layer of pepper corns also became known as the Pepper Wreck
100
 and 
will be later dealt in the chapter IV.2. 
 As the Dutch navigation in the Indian Ocean continued, King Philip II ordered to 
undertake constructions at Mozambique’s fortress São Sebastião101, situated at 
Mozambique Island, to protect the Portuguese East India navigation. In the same 
document, the King also ordered the observation of the Dutch activities as he thought 
that there might be plans to construct a fortress at Madagascar,
102
but as it turned out, the 
Dutch fleets of 1607 and 1608 aimed to conquer the São Sebastião fortress
103
.  
Instructed to attack the Portuguese and their allies in Asia
104
  and following the 
navigation of Steven van der Hagen
105
, the VOC send a fleet of eight ships, which 
departure took place in 1606, under the command of Paulus van Caerden
106
 while the 
operations of Haultain in the vicinities of the Iberian Peninsula were still ongoing
107
. 
After a long voyage, van Careen’s fleet arrived at Mozambique Island late March 
1607
108
, an unusual time for Portuguese outward bound fleets but still common for 
homeward bound fleets crossing the Indian Ocean due to the regime of the Monsoon 
winds and currents
109
. As in 1604, the Dutch had managed to capture two galleons of 
the homeward bound fleet and the Galeota
110
, a small vessel used for the annual 
shipment between Goa and Mozambique, but as the men and cargo of the ships had 
been removed to the fortress, the Dutch did not seize valuable cargo nor took prisoners 
and therefore tried to conquer the São Sebastião fortress, but once again failed to do so. 
In his letter, van Caerden later accused the size of the cannons or armory used for the 
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failure
111
. Leaving Mozambique Island for the continuation of the operations in the 
Indian Ocean on May 29
th
, the Zierickzee, a 760 tons ship
112
, was hit under gun fire 
from the S. Jorge tower, hit a shoal and ran aground off Cabaceira at the northern part of 
the Mozambique bar
113
.  
After taking refreshments at Mayotte Island
114
 situated in the northern part of the 
Mozambique Channel, van Caerden decided to return for a second attempt at 
Mozambique Island
115
. 
 Shortly after the departure of the Dutch, a part of the annual Portuguese outward 
bound fleet of 1607 under the command of D. Jeronimo Coutinho
116
, namely the naus 
Jesus, São Francisco and the Nossa Senhora da Penha da França arrived safely at 
Mozambique Island
117
. Being aware of the danger, the administration of Mozambique 
dispatched a small vessel for the islands of Angoche to
118
 warn the second part of the 
Portuguese outward bound fleet under the command of João Correia de Sousa, namely 
the galleons São Felipe e Santiago, Santo André and the naus Nossa Senhora do Loreto 
and Nossa Senhora da Consolação, which had left Lisbon two weeks after the departure 
of D. Jeronimo Coutinho
119
  to abort the planned stay at Mozambique Island and 
continue directly towards India
120
 but only the São Felipe e Santiago and the Nossa 
Senhora do Loreto had managed to do so
121
; the Nossa Senhora da Consolação and the 
Santo André arrived at Mozambique island in September, shortly after the departure of 
the van Caerden’s fleet in late August122.  
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 As a result of van Caerden’s attempt, the Dutch managed to capture the nau 
Nossa Senhora do Loreto at the Ilheus Queimados islands, of which, Portuguese 
historiography and sources would only refer to the loss of the cargo and the fact, that the 
ship was burnt
123
 but, as recent research in Dutch archives shows, the impact of the 
seizure of the Loreto’s cargo gave valuable information, provided in the royal 
Portuguese letters
124
. After the departure of the Dutch, the São Francisco was 
dispatched to continue its voyage towards India
125
 but after hitting a shoal off the 
church Nossa Senhora da Baluarte
126
 area, the ship was declared as not being 
seaworthy due to an accident which had prior occurred at the Mogincual shoals
127
 and 
due to the poor conditions of its hull structure
128
, the cabedal of 30,000 cruzados, the 
cargo and artillery were taken off and stored in the São Sebastião fortress
129
 and the 
ships mainmast as well as the foremast were cut off
130
. The galleon Santo André and the 
nau Nossa Senhora da Consolação, as observed above, arrived at Mozambique Island in 
September and were forced to stay until the following year’s monsoon season for 
outward bound ships
131
. 
In late 1607, the VOC dispatched a fleet of ships, nine bigger, the Fluyts, and four 
smaller, the jachten, under the command of Pieter Willemsz Verhoeff towards India and 
Asia
132
, eventually the last bigger fleet before the Twelve Years Truce (1609-1621)
133
. 
Provided with the same instructions as van der Hagen and van Caerden, Verhoeff 
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arrived upon Mozambique Island in late July 1608
134
 two months after the departure of 
the galleon Santo André
135
. Still at anchor, Verhoeff encountered the nau Nossa 
Senhora da Consolação and the annual Goa-Mozambique trade vessel but failed to 
capture the Nossa Senhora da Consolação from which they managed to seize some of 
the cargo namely ivory, Elephant tusks, wine, spices, and other goods
136
. As the ship 
had remained where it had stranded, the Portuguese burnt the Consolação the following 
night to avoid a second attempt of seizure
137
. The cabedal of the Nossa Senhora da 
Consolação, which amounted to 10,000 cruzados
138
 was still stored in the São 
Sebastião fortress when the Dutch tried to capture the ships
139
. While waiting for the 
arrival of the 1608 Portuguese outward bound fleet Verhoeff, like van der Hagen and 
Caerden, tried to conquer the island and fortress, which later on was abandoned and the 
focus had shifted towards the possible seizure of ships once again.      
The first Portuguese East India fleet of 1608 composed of nine galleons and five 
naus under the command of D. João Forjaz Pereira, Conde da Feira, left Lisbon on 
March 29
th140
 and arrived near Mozambique Island in mid August. Verhoeff send four 
ships, three jachten and a ship of higher capacity
141
 to attack the Portuguese galleon 
Bom Jesus which was unable to escape the attack; after being captured she was brought 
to proximity of the island of S. Tiago in the Southern Channel of Mozambique Island
142
 
where the ship was burnt. Shortly after the capture of the Bom Jesus, the Dutch set sail 
for Goa and Asia; during the voyage, the Dutch tried to capture the Portuguese nau 
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Nossa Senhora de Oliveira but to avoid the same, she was burnt in the vicinities of the 
Ilheus Queimados
143
.  
The second part of the 1608 Portuguese East India fleet composed of five sails, 
one galleon, one caravel, a pataxo and two urcas, under the command of Rui Lourenço 
de Távora, the new appointed Vice-king of the Portuguese Estado da Índia, who had 
left Lisbon on October 24
th144
, arrived in Mozambican waters after the departure of the 
Dutch and therefore was not involved in any military operations. 
 As a result of the Dutch siege of Mozambique Island, the Portuguese lost the 
Nossa Senhora da Consolação and the nau de trato or galeota de trato and the galleon 
Bom Jesus and the nau Nossa Senhora de Oliveira close to Goa. In that same year, there  
were several other losses of ships such as the loss of the nau Nossa Senhora da Palma 
off Mogincual shoal, the galleon Espírito Santo or Santo Espírito off the Costa da 
Cafraria, most likely near the Terra de Natal, the nau Salvação at the bar of 
Mombasa
145
. Either due to military operations or to other causes, no ship of the 
Portuguese outward bound fleets of 1608 arrived in India the said year
146
. On the other 
hand, the Dutch did not suffer any loss of a ship like the previous year.  
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II.1.1 Observations 
 
 Three Dutch East India fleets, the first under the command of Steven van der 
Hagen (1604), the second under the command of Paulus van Caerden (1607) and the 
last under the command of Pieter Willemsz. Verhoeff (1607/1608) attempted but failed 
to conquer the São Sebastião fortress at Mozambique Island, the important way-station 
of the Portuguese Carreira da Índia. While the Dutch only suffered the loss of one ship, 
the Zierickzee, in 1607, several Portuguese naus and galleons like the 1606 Nossa 
Senhora do Loreto off the Ilheus Queimados, the 1608 Nossa Senhora da Consolação 
off Mozambique Island, Nossa Senhora de Oliveira off Ilheus Queimados or Bom Jesus 
off Mogincual shoal were either captured and seized, or burnt to avoid the same; other 
ships were lost due either to bad navigation or condition of the ship such as the 1606 
Nossa Senhora da Salvação off Cascais, Portugal, the Nossa Senhora dos Mártires off 
São Julião de Barra, Lisbon, Portugal, the 1607 São Francisco or the 1608 Nossa 
Senhora de Palma off Mozambique. Either caused by direct impact due to military 
operations in Iberian or Mozambican waters, or due to indirect impact such as bad 
navigation or condition of the ships, the annual Portuguese East India fleets, the 
Carreira da Índia, were interrupted and, in times of military struggle of Portuguese-
Dutch supremacy for the spice trade, a continuous shipment of financial or military 
support for the Portuguese Estado da Índia intercepted. On the other hand, Dutch East 
India shipping did not lose many ships and even managed to expand its sphere of 
influence in the East Indies. Part of the general plan, the interception and break-down of 
the Portuguese East India shipping was not achieved as the annual Portuguese fleets 
continued. Nevertheless, due to the number of ships lost during the outward or 
homeward bound voyage, Portugal lost its position on the European market for oriental 
goods due to missing cargoes from Asia. Also, the ships and men lost had to be 
replaced, an additional cost in times of difficulties and financial bottle-neck situations. 
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II.2 The Twelve Years Truce 
1609-1621 
 
 Following the first encounters and naval battles fought for European overseas 
interests and supremacy, in this case the interception of the annual Portuguese East 
Indies shipping, the Carreira da Índia, and the three attempts to conquer Mozambique 
Island by the Dutch, the Twelve Years Truce (1609-1621)
147
 is generally seen and 
characterized as a period of calm due to the absence of planned military operations in 
European waters or the western Indian Ocean
148
. Encounters of ships, such as the Witte 
Leeuw incident, a Dutch ship sunk by the two Portuguese homeward bound naus Nossa 
Senhora de Nazaré and the Nossa Senhora de Vencimento e Monte do Carmo in the 
vicinities of Santa Helena in 1613
149
, were more of an accidental momentum than a 
planned military operation documented by the virtual nonexistence of shipwrecks on 
both sides
150
.  
 It was agreed by both sides that each party maintained their occupied overseas 
possessions and no further expansion was supposed to be undertaken during the period 
of twelve years
151
. As the process of negotiations for the Truce was still in process, the 
Dutch dispatched the small jacht Goede Hoop to instruct the captain of the 1607 Dutch 
outward bound East India fleet, Pieter Willesmz. Verhoeff, to maintain and, if possible, 
to extend the Dutch sphere of influence, especially regarding the Spice Islands by 
creating commercial and friendly relationships with the local authorities
152
. As the 
Truce was signed in the United Provinces on April, 9
th
 1609 both sides accepted to send 
                                                          
147
 About the Twelve Years Truce: Jonathan I. Israel, op. cit., pp. 80-86, 101-106; André Murteira, “El 
Impacto la Tregua de los Doce Años en los dominios ultramarinos portugueses”, in Bernardo García 
García, Manuel Herrero Sánchez, Alain Hugon (eds.), Actas del X Seminario Internacional de Historia: 
el arte de la prudencia-la Tregua de los Doce Años en la Europa de los Pacificadores (1598-1618), 
Madrid, Fundación Varlos Amberes, 2012, pp. 275-293.  
148
 See: André Murteira, op. cit., p. 153 
149
 See: Idem, pp. 153-158; João C. Reis, João Miguel O. Reis, José João O. Reis, op. cit.,, pp. 265, f.; 
Eduardo Frutuoso, Paulo Guinote, António Lopes,  As Armadas da Índia 1497-1835, Lisbon, Comissão 
Nacional para as Comemorações dos Descobrimentos Portugueses, 2002, p. 155; R. Bruijn, F. S. Gaastra, 
I. Schöffer (eds.), op. cit., vol. II, pp. 16, f. 
150
 See: Eduardo Frutuoso, Paulo Guinote, António Lopes, Naufrágios e Outras Perdas  da “Carreira da 
Índia”: Séculos XVI e XVII, op. cit., pp. 239-244; R. Bruijn, F. S. Gaastra, I. Schöffer (eds.), op. cit., vol. 
II, pp. 26-49; Idem, vol. III, pp. 14-25. 
151
 See: Raymundo António de Bulhão Pato (dir.), op. cit., pp. 252, f. 
152
 See: N. Mac Leod, op. cit., p. 81; Alfredo Botelho de Sousa, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 142, f. 
39 
 
a representative of each party on board of a Dutch vessel, the jacht Hazewind to deliver 
the news of the conceived Truce in the East Indies
153
. However, it is stated that the 
representative from Spain and Portugal did not board the said ship in February 1610
154
 
and the vessel continued its voyage towards Bantam. After the signature of the Truce in 
1608 and still before the official commencement of the agreed freedom of navigation, 
the Portuguese king send a letter to the Vice-king Ruy Lourenço de Távora instructing 
him to try to convince the local authorities and kings not to allow Dutch-Asiatic 
shipping and commercial activities in their respective ports
155
.  
 During the time of the Truce, the Portuguese king ordered the fortification and 
expansion of the defense system of Mozambique Island due to its importance as way-
station for the Portuguese outward bound fleets and Estado da Índia
156
, the necessary 
repairs after the attacks in 1607 and 1608 and the possibility of a new attack and plan of 
conquering the São Sebastião fortress
157
. Fearing disobedience and eventually the 
breaking of the Truce by the Dutch, the Portuguese king received news annually on the 
preparations and departure of outward bound Dutch East India fleets by local informants 
which immediately were sent towards India
158
 but also received direct information 
concerning the Dutch-Asiatic shipping by the Vice-king and other officials.  
 Until the second decade of the 17
th
 century, the European struggle for supremacy 
in the East India trade involved mainly the Luso-Dutch warfare in Asian waters and the 
Western Indian Ocean. The entrance of the English East India Company (EIC) created a 
new hostile environment, especially due to the construction of English factories in the 
Indonesian Archipelago
159
 and the Persian Gulf region
160
. Negotiations at the two 
London conferences in 1613 and 1615 and the possibility of a merger of the two 
European East India Companies
161
, the VOC and the EIC, endangered the Portuguese 
East India trade. Although the merger of the VOC and EIC was not finalized, a “loose 
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treaty of collaboration”162 which led to the “treaty of defense” against the Portuguese 
and Spanish (1619-1623)
163
 was settled.  Although the Dutch and English had agreed on 
collaborating against the Portuguese and Spanish, a naval conflict for the supremacy of 
the trade in the Indonesian Archipelago between the VOC and EIC in the vicinities of 
the Bantam islands and Batavia (nowadays Jakarta)
164
 led to the expulsion of the 
English and the definite establishment of the VOC’s headquarters at Batavia.165 This, 
together with the 1618 Zwarte Leeuw incident, a Dutch outward bound vessel which 
was captured by the English in the vicinities of Bantam in December 1618
166
 are 
evidence for different visions regarding economical overseas politics.  
Portuguese attempts to negotiate an extension of the Twelve Years Truce or a 
new kind of peace treaty which existed since 1619
167
 did not result in a continuation of 
a more or less peaceful environment. The VOC voluntarily abandoned the project
168
 due 
to the above mentioned Anglo-Dutch treaty but also due economical interests of 
expanding the commercial relationships in Asia. The outbreak of the Thirty Years War 
(1618-1648) in Europe had its part in taking a decision on the renewal of the rivalries as 
well
169
.  
 At the dawn of the English East India Company’s trade in the Persian Gulf 
region of which the raw silk commerce played the major point of interest for the 
Europeans, encounters with the Portuguese such as the 1613 Nossa Senhora da Nazaré 
incident
170
 and the loss of the 1616 galleon São Julião which was voluntarily burnt at 
the Comoro islands to avoid being seized by the English
171
 were rare and naval battles 
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are seen as an exception. During the decade 1610-1620, the Persian Shah had constantly 
expanded his sphere of political and economical influence in the Persian Gulf region 
which the Portuguese tried to counteract with several attacks on the western shores such 
as nowadays Bahrain, Oman and Qatar. Hormuz, situated on the eastern shore of the 
entry to the Persian Gulf was one of the most important Portuguese fortresses of Estado 
da Índia controlling the maritime trade of the Persian waters for more than a century
172
. 
As frictions between the parties involved grew, a military conflict which led to the 
Portuguese loss of Hormuz to the joint English and Persian forces was inevitable. 
 
 
 
II.2.1 Observations 
 
 During the second decade of the 17
th
 century, the strained relationship between 
the Portuguese Estado da Índia and the Dutch East India Company seemed to have 
eased during the Twelve Years Truce. The appearance of the English East India 
Company at the scenario of the struggle for European supremacy in the spice trade and 
for any other desired Asian goods such as silk represents a new momentum and a third 
party involved. Negotiations for a possible merger of the two private European East 
India companies and the “loose” treaty of collaboration were significant changes 
challenging the Portuguese Estado da Índia. 
 Having tried to maintain and restore its economical relationships and commerce 
in Asian waters, the Portuguese initiatives, following Boyajian, failed mainly due to 
internal difficulties such as the financial incapacity to build the ten galleons in Indian 
shipyards, meant for the escort of the Portuguese China trade, caused by the misuse of 
the Estrada’s treasury under the reign of Vice-king D. Jerónimo d’ Azevedo173. The 
Habsburg policy regarding the Cape route during the second decade of the 17
th
 century 
had its impacts on the decline of the Carreira shipping and the shortage of the revenues 
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for the annual carracks
174
. The European competitors of the Portuguese Asia shipping 
had established and underlined their presence in Asian waters but still were far from the 
exclusion of the their main competitor, the Estado da Índia and its commercial network. 
However, the hostile environment grew and a continuation of the Twelve Years 
Truce or any other treaty of peaceful economic relationships seemed unlikely to be 
established. Frictions and tensions between the European naval powers grew and the 
hostile environment was a rather stable momentum during the decade of 1620 and a 
continuation of the prior one. 
Nevertheless, the relatively absence of shipwrecks caused by military operations 
by any European naval power or suffered by the same are scarce and if occurred, mainly 
characterized as incidents. Regarding the case of the 1616 São Julião incident, Quirinho 
da Fonseca and Henrique Lopes de Mendonça attributed the loss of the said ship to the 
Dutch instead of the English
175
. 
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II.3 1621-1623 
The recurrence of naval conflicts 
 
 By the year 1621, European nations were involved in the Thirty Years War 
(1618-1648). The succession of Philip IV (1621-1665) to the throne of Spain (and king 
of Portugal as Philip III until 1640) in the same year inflamed the Spanish-Dutch 
conflict once again and Dutch-Iberian shipping was prohibited by a new embargo, 
affecting less the Portuguese than the Spanish
176
. As the Twelve Years Truce expired 
and no continuation of a rather peaceful relationship between the Dutch and Portuguese 
was completed, the Armada of Defense, a joined naval force against the Spanish and 
Portuguese shipping, was created. 
 Regarding the recurrence of naval conflicts and planed military operations in the 
Western Indian Ocean, the two 1621 Dutch outward bound ships Wappen van 
Rotterdam and the Mauritius, which had left Holland in November and December of the 
previous year
177
 encountered the 1622 homeward bound Portuguese nau São João 
Baptista, which had left Goa accompanied by the Paraizo in early March of the same 
year and started to pursue and attack her
178
. Departing quite late for the homeward 
bound voyage of the Carreira da Índia, the two ships were separated from each other in 
the vicinities of the Cape of Good Hope
179
.  After the encounter between the two 
European naval powers which lasted 19 days and did not result in a seizure of the 
Portuguese vessel, the São João Baptista ran aground on the South African shores of the 
region known as Terra de Natal
180
. 
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 Simultaneously, while the first Anglo-Dutch fleet of defense, composed of five 
Dutch and five English ships of higher capacity, was operating in the far oriental parts 
of Asia, the theatre of possible Anglo-Dutch attacks on Spanish or Portuguese Asiatic 
shipping situated between Macau and Japan
181
, and the Anglo-Persian battle against the 
Portuguese in Ormus was ongoing, a second fleet of defense, composed of seven Dutch 
and four English ships
182
 was sent on a mission to attack the Portuguese Carreira 
outward and homeward bound shipping in the Western Indian Ocean and, if possible, to 
undertake a blockade of Portuguese Goa.
183
 However, it suffered a defragmentation of 
the joint forces before the attack: two Dutch ships were send back to Batavia, two Dutch 
and one English ship towards the Red Sea and the t´Hert was lost after chasing a 
Portuguese ship between Madagascar and Mozambique Island, the São Pedro
184
, which, 
after being captured and seized was burnt. 
Departing Lisbon in March 1622, the annual Portuguese outward bound fleet 
under the command of the new Vice-king D. Francisco da Gama, initially composed of 
four naus da Carreira, two galleons and 2 pataxos
185
, was weakened by the separation 
of the nau São Tomé and the galleon Trindade close to the passage of the Equator
186
. 
Continuing its journey towards India, the fleet encountered three sails in the 
vicinities of the Cape of Good Hope, the São João Baptista attack
187
, but passed without 
intervention due to the misjudgment and non recognition of the Dutch attack on the 
Portuguese ship
188
. After verifying that the 1622 Portuguese outward bound fleet had 
not arrived yet in Mozambique Island, the Anglo-Dutch fleet waited for their arrival 
between Mozambique Island and the Angoche islands group situated south of 
Mozambique Island in the Mozambique Channel without an attempt to attack the São 
Sebastião fortress. The remaining six ships under the command of Jacob Dedel 
encountered the four Portuguese sails, the São José, the São Carlos, the Santa Teresa de 
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Jesus and the galleon São Salvador in the vicinities of the Mogincual shoals on June 
23
rd 
concentrating their forces on the weakest of the Portuguese ships, the São José. 
Verifying the situation of the São José, the São Carlos and the Santa Teresa de 
Jesus managed to escape the enemy’s attacks but were both lost while entering the 
harbor of Mozambique Island
189
 and only the galleon Trindade safely managed to enter 
the said place. Still, the Anglo-Dutch fleet managed to salvage an approximate amount 
of 68,553 cruzados in reales-of-eight of the São José
190
 before her final sinking upon 
the Mogincual shoals
191
. The loss declared by the Vice-king D. Francisco da Gama was 
accounted at approximately 18,000 cruzados stored in nine boxes
192
. Without any 
further attempt to conquer Mozambique Island as in the first decade of the 17
th
 century, 
the fleet set sail for Goa. 
As news of the loss of Ormus arrived in Lisbon late 1622, the planned annual 
outward bound fleet of three naus was reinforced by three galleons and two pataxos. As 
the revenues of the Carreira trade were declining and the Silver Armada from the New 
World had not arrived in Spain due to a storm in the Caribbean that caused, at least, the 
loss of Nuestra Señora de Atocha, the Santa Margarita and another ship
193
, King Philip 
was urged to accept different forms of financing the 1623 outward bound fleet by using 
part of his own money as well as a loan given by the Lisbon Santa Casa da 
Misericórdia. Of the 1623 Portuguese fleet, only the galleon Santo André arrived in Goa 
the same year, the remaining ships were forced to winter at Mozambique Island, where, 
due to a storm in January 1624, the galleon São Simão, the nau Santa Isabel and the 
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pataxo São Braz were declared not seaworthy due to the damages suffered
194
. The rest 
of the prior year’s fleet arrived in Goa later in 1624. 
Existing plans for a continuation of the Western Indian Ocean fleet of defense in 
1624 were abandoned by the English as the struggle for the supremacy in South East 
Asia grew due to different opinions regarding the Portuguese and Spanish Asiatic 
shipping and to the difficulties in attacking the outward bound Carreira shipping in 
particular but specially due to the 1623 incident of the shared factory and fort of 
Amboina. Due to the discontinuation of the Anglo-Dutch treaty of defense and a rather 
unobstructed voyage, the 1624 Portuguese outward bound fleet of two naus and six 
galleons, which had left Lisbon in March, arrived in India in September ofthe said year. 
 
 
 
II.3.1 Observations 
 
After the expiration of the Twelve Years Truce, the European struggle for 
supremacy of the spice trade entered a new phase. The joined Anglo-Persian forces 
launched an attack on Ormus and conquered one of the most important strongholds of 
the Portuguese Estado da Índia controlling the entrance to the Persian Gulf region. The 
1622 homeward bound São João Baptista was attacked by two Dutch outward bound 
ships close to the Cape of Good Hope and lost.  
During a short time period, the Anglo-Dutch fleets of defense, one operating in 
the Far East, the other in the Western Indian Ocean, of which the later was involved in 
the attack on the 1622 Portuguese outward bound fleet under the command of the new 
Vice-king D. Francisco da Gama and the loss of the nau São José at Mogincual shoals 
and the galleons São Carlos and Santa Teresa de Jesus at the harbor of Mozambique 
Island.  
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 See: André Murteira, op. cit., p. 240; Eduardo Frutuoso, Paulo Guinote, António Lopes, op. cit., pp. 
245, f. 
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Due not only to enemy attacks on the Portuguese outward and homeward bound 
shipping, the Carreira lost several ships on the Eastern African shores, especially a vital 
part of the 1623 outward fleet which, by wintering at Mozambique Island, was struck by 
a storm and three of the ships lost. Also, the losses of ships of the 1622 Spanish Silver 
Armada in the Caribbean overshadowed the financial situation of the Portuguese Estado 
da Índia and the outfitting of the 1623 outward bound fleet in particular.  
Due to the discontinuation of the Western Indian Ocean Anglo-Dutch fleet of 
defense, the 1624 outward bound fleet did not suffer any attack. As no further attempt 
either to attack the Portuguese Asiatic shipping in the Western Indian Ocean and in the 
vicinities of Mozambique Island occurred neither to conquer the São Sebastião fortress, 
the European struggle for the supremacy was rather focused on the Eastern parts of the 
Indian Ocean, the Indian coast and the Straits of Melaka in particular. 
 
 
 
II.4 Final Remarks 
 
During the course of the first quarter of the 17
th
 century, the European Asiatic 
shipping and spice trade faced several changes. The joining of several companies to 
Dutch Asiatic in 1602, uniformed by the creation of the United Dutch East India 
Company (VOC) caused a variety of implications regarding trade, policy and economy. 
Until the appearance of the Dutch, and later the English, European Asiatic trade was a 
monopoly of the Portuguese that, after 1580, was ruled by the Spanish kings. The 
struggle for the independence of the Lower Provinces against the Habsburg Empire was 
extended and taken overseas as a struggle for free trade and access to spices and other 
oriental goods as several decrees of the Spanish expelled the Dutch from the Lisbon 
market. Gaining access for Asiatic shipping was not only undertaken by diplomacy but 
rather by planned military operations in European and Asian waters. Several attacks, 
blockades and attempts to hinder the Portuguese trade and shipping in the East, the 
Carreira da Índia, caused losses of ships and an increase of extraordinary expenses 
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such as the fortification of strategic coastal points and fortresses such as Mozambique 
Island which, by a decline of the revenues, were difficult to deal with.  
Mozambique Island, the important way-station of the Carreira’s outward bound 
shipping was one of the theatres of the European struggle for supremacy during the first 
and third decades of the 17
th
 century. The attempts to conquer the island with its harbor 
and the São Sebastião fortress in 1604, 1607 and 1608, the attacks on the Portuguese 
outward and homeward bound shipping in its surroundings during the same time and, 
after the discontinuation of the Twelve Years Truce (1609-1621) ended with the last 
planned and executed military operations in the Western Indian ocean by the joined 
Anglo-Dutch forces, the fleet of defense in 1622. Also, the establishment of the English 
Asiatic commerce, mainly with the Persians led to the conquest of the Portuguese 
possession of Ormus (1622), one of the strongholds of the Estado da Índia and the loss 
of the control over the Persian Gulf trade. 
The effects of the European naval combats in East Africa resulted, as a direct 
impact, in several captures and losses of ships such as the 1606 Nossa Senhora do 
Loreto, the 1608 Nossa Senhora da Consolação and Bom Jesus as well as the 1622 São 
João Baptista, the São José, the São Carlos and the Santa Teresa de Jesus but the 
Portuguese Asiatic shipping also suffered shipwrecks due to non-military impacts such 
as the losses of the 1623 outward bound ships São Braz, São Simão, and the Santa 
Isabel due to a storm in early 1624. Shipwrecks not only symbolized loss of cargo and 
money but moreover the loss of the means of transport, the ship itself, which had to be 
replaced, signified a decline of economic and military operational material. 
Indirectly, the Carreira suffered from lesser revenues of the spice trade but also 
from delays of the scheduled calendar of arrival and departure in Asia and Europe due 
to blockades and lesser quantity of goods arriving from the Far East meant for Europe. 
As Portuguese ships usually left Lisbon in March, latest in April, arriving in Goa late 
September the same year and were ready for the homeward bound voyage departing in 
January and arriving in Lisbon between August and September, due mainly to the 
Monsoon regime of the Indian Ocean, the military operations were quite predictable and 
easy to hinder however, in the aftermath, the Dutch did not succeed in the attempt to 
rule out the Portuguese.  
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 Table 1 illustrates the outward bound and homeward Portuguese Carreira 
shipping during the years in which the Dutch and English attacks occurred. Losses of 
ships in the Mozambique Channel are indicated by the total number (figure 1 in the 
column “Loss” and “Percentage of loss”) as well as caused by enemies’ attacks (figure 2 
in column “Loss” and “Percentage of loss”); the captures and losses of the 1604, 1608 
and 1622 nau de trato or galeão de trato (annual voyage Goa-Mozambique-Goa) in 
Mozambican waters are excluded as not being part of the outward bound or homeward 
bound Carreira shipping. 
 
Year Outward Arrival Arrival Discontinued/ Loss Percentage 
 
Bound same year following years Aborted 
 
of loss 
       1604 5 1 0 3 1/ 0 20/ 0 
1607 3 2 0 0 1/ 0 33/ 0 
1607 4 1 1 0 2/ 1 50/ 50 
1608 6 0 1 1 4/ 0 67/ 0 
1608 8 0 4 2 2/ 1 25/ 50 
1616 3 1 0 1 1/ 1 33/ 100 
1622 4 1 0 0 3/ 3 75/ 100 
1622 4 3 0 1 0/ 0 0/ 0 
1623 8 1 3 0 4/ 0 50/ 0 
       Year Homeward Arrival Arrival Discontinued/ Loss Percentage 
 
Bound same year following years Aborted 
 
of loss 
       1622 2 1 
  
1/ 1 50/ 100 
Table 1: “Effects of the Dutch and English attacks on the Carreira da Índia”195 
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 See: André Murteira, op. cit., pp. 148-152, 208-210; Eduardo Frutuoso, Paulo Guinote, António 
Lopes,  As Armadas da Índia 1497-1835, op. cit., pp. 149-154, 157, 160-163; Naufrágios e Outras Perdas  
da “Carreira da Índia”: Séculos XVI e XVII, op. cit., pp. 235-246. 
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III Underwater Archaeology 
 
III.1 The underwater geological formations of the 
Mozambique Channel 
and the Carreira da Índia 
 
 The passage through the Mozambique Channel, especially for the outward 
bound Portuguese Asiatic shipping was one of the most dangerous sections of the 
Carreira da Índia due to various reasons. First, the Mozambique Channel, the strait 
between the island of Madagascar and the African mainland, was the direct path for the 
outward bound shipping from Portugal towards Mozambique Island, the important 
entrepôt of the Carreira da Índia as it was the first place for taking refreshments and 
curing the sick after leaving the Cape Verde islands archipelago in the Eastern Atlantic 
Ocean and having had passed the Cape of Good Hope. Although known for its difficult 
navigation since the early days of the Portuguese Cape route trade, Mozambique Island 
became one of the most important way stations where, during the course of the 16
th
 and 
17
th
 century, a factory, a hospital and several defense systems and ultimately the São 
Sebastião fortress were constructed.  
Entering the channel on the outward bound voyage, the ships usually took a 
northeastern course steering towards the Baixos da Índia shoals, then directing the 
course closer to the mainland and passing between the Parcel de Sofala and João de 
Nova Island towards the Primeiras Islands group heading towards Mozambique 
Island
196
. Stated in his notes regarding the Carreira in 1556, João Pereira Damtas 
mentioned the adverse winds and currents in the section of the Parcel de Sofala area, the 
                                                          
196
 See: Comandante Humberto Leitão, Dois roteiros do século XVI, de Manuel Monteiro e Gaspar 
Ferreira Reimão, atribuidos a João Baptista Lavanha, Lisbon, Centro de Estudos Históricos 
Ultramarinos, 1963, pp. 49-53. 
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calmness of the winds which sometimes occurred, caused sickness and death of the 
seamen
197
. 
As stated in the Roteiros
198
, the contemporary navigation descriptions and 
sailing directions of the 16
th
 and 17
th
 century, the passage followed after the Parcel is 
characterized by several dangerous shoals and sandbanks, especially regarding the 
hazards situated between the Primeiras Islands group, situated at 17
º
5´S and 17
º
17´S 
latitude and Mozambique Island, situated in 15
0
02´S latitude, 40
º
44´E longitude. 
Following the instructions of the Roteiro of navigation, reedited by Gaspar Ferreira 
Reimão in 1612
199
, Portuguese pilots were reminded of a careful navigation avoiding a 
course too close to the shore as some of the reefs and sandbanks could reach up to two 
léguas into the channel itself. Regarding the roadstead of Mozambique Island, these 
hazards were and still are, namely, the reefs and sandbanks surrounding the Primeiras 
Islands group and the Angoche islands, situated between 16
º
21´S and 16
º
41´S latitude, 
the Mogincual shoal, actually characterized by three distinctive shoals, namely 
Chataputa, Infusse and Mucalanga, situated in 15
º
35´S latitude and between two to three 
nautical miles off shore
200
, a patch called Os Currais, situated in 15
º
46´S latitude and 
today known as Mecade shoal
201
. Before entering the harbor of Mozambique Island, the 
1607 outward bound nau São Francisco struck parts of the Mogincual shoals nine 
times, causing considerable damage to the hull structure and leaking water as stated in 
the historical documentation
202
. 
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 See: “Apontamentos que fez João Pereira Damtas por mandado del Rey D. João terceiro no anno de 
1556.”, sobre o modo de remediar as perdas das naus da carreira e navegação da Índia. Biblioteca do 
Palácio de Ajuda, códice 51-VI-54, fols. 85-88. 
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 See: “Roteiros”, in Luís de Albuquerque (dir.), Francisco Contente Domingues (coord.), Dicionário de 
História dos Descobrimentos Portugueses, Lisbon, Círculo de Leitores, 1994, vol. II, pp. 390, f. 
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 See: Gaspar Ferreira Reimão, Roteiro da Navegação e Carreira da Índia, com seus caminhos, & 
derrotas, sinais, & aguageis & differenças  da agulha: tirado do que  escreveu Vicente Rodrigues & 
Diogo Afonso, pilotos antigos, agora novamente acrescentado a viagem de Goa por dentro de São 
Lourenço, & Moçambique, & outras muitas cousas, & advertências, por Gaspar Ferreira Reimão; 
prefáciado por A. Fontoura da Costa, 2
nd
 edition, Lisbon, Agência Geral das Colónias, 1939. 
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 See: Idem, p. 101. 
201
 See: Idem, p. 98. 
202
 See: T. W. Baxter, A. da Silva Rego, op. cit., vol., IX, pp. 442, f. 
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Figure 2: “Carta Reduzida do Canal de Mossambique”, ca. 1784203 
 
                                                          
203
 See: Jacinto José Paganino, “Carta Reduzida do canal de Mosambique entre a costa de África e a Ilha 
de S. Lourenço athe a Equinocial”, ca. 1784,  BNL, C.C. 58 A. 
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Mozambique Islands harbor was also a hazard for the Portuguese outward bound 
shipping. Usually arriving at the said place at the end of the Monsoon season, the bigger 
ships of the Carreira, the naus and galleons could only enter the Northern channel at 
high tide between noon and late afternoon by passing between São Jorge Islet and 
Cabaceira shoal (reaching from the mainland into the entry channel), passing the Lewen 
Bank and the São Sebastião fortress with its shoal surrounding the point of Nossa 
Senhora do Baluarte, to reach the inner harbor between the mainland and Mozambique 
Island. The Northern passage or entry channel is characterized by depths ranging from 9 
to 40m depth. 
Only small ships up to 300 tons were able to enter the outer harbor situated on 
the Eastern part of Mozambique Island the beach of Santo António, also known as the 
old fortress and the São Sebastião fortress by passing the Southern channel between São 
Jorge and Santiago islet
204
. 
Anchorage at Mozambique Island was, and still is, characterized by a tidal range 
of several meters reaching up to 6m at some areas. The tidal range velocity causes a 
current generally registered as up to 4 knots. Bigger naus and galleons therefore could 
have been floating while anchoring at high tide but set on the seabed on low tide 
causing damages to the stressed hull structure after the long voyage passing the Atlantic 
Ocean and the Cape of Good Hope, a factor usually not taken into consideration for the 
short life span of the Carreira ships or losses of outward bound vessels. This data 
justifies the loss of the 1607 São Francisco after wintering and part of the 1623 outward 
bound fleet which, while wintering and due to a storm, was lost in early 1624 as 
described above. 
Furthermore, the surroundings of Mozambique Island are characterized by the 
river mouth of the Calombo, Lombe and Mossuril (Calumbo) rivers forming the 
Mossuril Bay; its constant inflow of sweet water, sediments and microorganisms posed 
as another hazard for the wood structure of the Carreira ships, causing a slow but 
constant rottenness of the ships by mineral bacteria when wintering for a period of 
almost a year.   
 Scientific hydrographical data of the Mozambican coast was obtained by the 
research done by the English admiralty under the command of Captain Owen published 
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in 1832, the data obtained by researches and compiled as The Africa Pilot by Captain 
Horsey as well as by the research of Leote do Rêgo, a Portuguese officer, published in 
1904 as “Guide book and sailing directions”. There Common features of these works 
with the old Portuguese Roteiros, though more detailed, are the general sailing 
directions, observations of winds, currents, tides, depths and hazards such as shoals and 
sandbanks but also the introduction of new aspects of navigation such as tidal ranges 
and more accurate position of hazards. 
 A combined reading of the Roteiros and the works of Horsey, Owen and Rêgo 
contribute to a better understanding of the Portuguese Asiatic shipping in Mozambican 
waters but also prove the difficulties in understanding why shipwrecks occurred during 
the historical time period studied in this thesis, the first quarter of the 17
th
 century. The 
Roteiros are pilots written by experienced individuals that describe an experienced 
navigation. Therefore, the Roteiro does not apply for a long term observation of a 
specific geographical area for instance, the Northern Channel of the entry to the inner 
harbor of Mozambique Island. Although being a description by observation according 
to scientific methods of the mid 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century, neither the Africa Pilot by 
Horsey nor the Guide book by Rêgo can provide answers to specific questions of the 
Portuguese Carreira shipping as they were written in a time of mainly self-propelled 
vessels, the steamships. The naus and galleons were non-self-propelled vessels 
depending on natural conditions such as winds and currents. Hazards such as the shoals 
and sandbanks between the Primeiras Islands group and Mozambique Island and the 
Mozambique Island harbor with its characteristics itself, were dangers faced by the 
sailing ships of the 16
th
 and 17
th
 century, especially the bigger nau of four decks which 
had a deeper draught than the ones with only three decks but were easier to avoid by the 
later steamships.  
 Having studied the characteristics of the Mozambique Channel and the Carreira 
da Índia shipping it becomes clear that the inner passage, the route between the African 
mainland and the island of Madagascar was one of the most dangerous sections of the 
cape route. Following the data presented by Guinote, a total of 54 out of 219 known and 
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documented shipwrecks occurred in the Mozambique Channel between 1497 and 1650, 
accounting to a total of 24.7 percent
205
. 
 
 
Figure 3: “Hydrographic plan of Mozambique Island”, 1823206 
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 Eduardo Frutuoso, Paulo Guinote, António Lopes, Naufrágios e Outras Perdas da “Carreira da 
Índia”: Séculos XVI e XVII, op. cit., p. 124. 
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 See: “A Survey of Mozambique Harbor under the direction of Capt. W. F. W. Owen”, 1823 AHU, 
AHU_CARTi_064.D.509. 
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III.2 Underwater archaeology – Evidence of shipwrecks 
 
 Evidence of the hazards faced by the Carreira shipping in the Mozambique 
Channel, namely the remains of shipwrecks were discovered, documented, excavated 
and, in some cases, artefacts recovered by Arqueonautas Worldwide, Arqueologia 
Subaquática S. A., a private marine archaeology company which in partnership with 
Património Internacional S.A.R.L., a Mozambican state controlled company. In 1999, 
the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Mozambique, granted the license for 
underwater archaeological activities in Mozambican waters, namely the province of 
Nampula covering the areas between the Lúrio river, situated in 13
º
30´S latitude,  and 
Fogo island, situated in 17
º
14´S latitude, (North-South direction), the most southern of 
the Primeiras Islands group. 
 Based on data obtained by the underwater archaeological observations done until 
recently, a combined archaeological and historiographical analysis and observation of 
five shipwrecks of the Carreira da Índia, the 1608 Nossa Senhora da Consolação and 
the São Francisco, the 1622 Santa Teresa de Jesus, the São Carlos and the São José as 
well as one Dutch shipwreck, the 1622’t Hert, aims to provide new information by 
using shipwrecks as sources for Maritime History. 
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Figure 4: “General site plan of shipwrecks in the vicinities of Mozambique Island”207 
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 See: “general site plan of all shipwrecks in the vicinities of Mozambique Island discovered and 
documented by Arqueonautas Worldwide, Arqueologia Subaquática S. A., archive of Arqueonautas 
Worldwide, Arqueologia Subaquática S. A. 
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III.3 1608 Naus São Francisco and 
Nossa Senhora da Consolação 
 
 As observed in chapter II.1, the 1608 São Francisco was part of the first outward 
bound fleet of 1607, the Nossa Senhora da Consolação, a nau, was part of the second 
outward bound fleet of 1607 which arrived at Mozambique Island in September of the 
same year. Being too late for the continuation of the voyage towards India, the ships 
remained wintering at Mozambique Island together. The São Francisco hit a shoal in 
the vicinities of the chapel Nossa Senhora do Baluarte, situated at the northern end of 
Mozambique Island close to the São Sebastião Fortress. As she was declared not 
seaworthy, her main masts were cut and the cargo and her artillery taken out
208
. The 
remains of the ship were destroyed in a storm that hit the island in 1613.  
 During the course of several survey campaigns of Arqueonautas Worldwide 
(2001-2013), four wreck sites (IDM-001, IDM-006, IDM-007 and IDM-014) in the 
vicinities of the Nossa Senhora de Baluarte shoal have been surveyed and partially 
excavated
209
 but a more decisive rather than tentative identification was not possible due 
to the relative absence of sufficient cultural material, armament or wood structure 
through which one of the four shipwrecks could be identified as the São Francisco. 
 The situation of the nau Nossa Senhora da Consolação differs from the São 
Francisco. Unlike the prior shipwreck, the Consolação was lost due to an attempt of 
seizure during the course of the 1608 Dutch blockade and siege of Mozambique Island 
under the command of Pieter Willemsz. Verhoeff.  Acknowledging that the first attempt 
had failed and that the ship remained stranded, the Portuguese set her on fire, impeding 
a successful second attempt; the Dutch only managed to seize some cargo. 
                                                          
208
 See: T. W. Baxter, A. da Silva Rego (eds.), op. cit., pp. 440-443. 
209
 See: Alejandro Mirabal, Interim Report of the Marine Archaeological Survey performed in 
Mozambique Island, from May to July 2001., pp. 6, 10; Idem, Second Interim Report of the Marine 
Archaeological Survey performed in Ilha de Moçambique, from March to July 2004., pp. 9, f.; 
Intermediate Report on Underwater Archaeological Excavation in Mogincual and Survey off the Island of 
Mozambique, from April to November 2007., pp. 31-34, 40 
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 During the 2001 and following survey and excavation campaigns
210
, a quite 
isolated wreck site was discovered, situated near Cabaceira Pequena reef at the North-
Eastern part of the entry channel separating the African main land from Mozambique 
Island. The site, registered as IDM-003, the third shipwreck discovered in the vicinities 
of Mozambique Island (IDM), was excavated and the remains of the wood structure 
served for the study and reconstruction of the second Portuguese East Indiaman after the 
Nossa Senhora dos Mártires by Filipe Castro. The confirmation of traces of fire, the 
isolated position and the artefacts of cultural material
211
, the wreck site IDM-003 led to 
a tentative identification of the 1608 Nossa Senhora da Consolação. The tentative 
identification was supported by the comparison of the description of the merchandise 
encountered and taken by the Dutch, namely elephant tusks, olive jars and other goods 
and the artefacts that were excavated, documented and recovered from the site
212
. 
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 See: Alejandro Mirabal, Interim Report of the Marine Archaeological Survey performed in 
Mozambique Island, from May to July 2001, p. 8, f.; Intermediate Report on the Underwater 
Archaeological Excavations off the Island of Mozambique and Mogincual, from April to November 2005., 
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Mogincual, from March to November 2006., pp. 21-53; Complete list of artefacts recovered from the 
wreck sites IDM-003 and MOG-003during the 2005 excavation season., pp. 1-4. 
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 See: Alejandro Mirabal (ed.), The Excavation of the Nossa Senhora da Consolação (1608), op. cit., pp. 
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 See: Idem, ibidem.  
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Figure 5: “Site plan of the wreck site IDM-003”213 
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 See: “Site plan indicating the wreck site IDM-003”, archive of Arqueonautas Worldwide, Arqueologia 
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III.4 1622 Nau São José 
 
 The nau São José, or also referred to as São Joseph in the historical 
documentation, was part of the 1622 Portuguese outward bound fleet under the 
command of the new appointed Vice-king D. Francisco da Gama
214
. During the course 
of the attack by the second Anglo-Dutch fleet of defense under the command of Jacob 
Dedel in late June, the said ship was separated from the Santa Teresa de Jesus, São 
Carlos and the São Salvador given the fact that she was the last of the convoy
215
. As the 
attack continued, the heavily destroyed São José drifted to the Mogincual shoals where 
she stranded. Concentrating their forces at the São José, the Anglo-Dutch fleet managed 
to take a certain number of prisoners, mainly orphans, and a certain amount of money 
declared by the Portuguese to be 18,000 cruzados, stored in nine cases
216
 or 30,000 
cruzados stored in 15 cases
217
 and by the Anglo-Dutch forces to be approximately 
68,000 reales
218
 or 668,553 reales of eight
219
, depending on the documentation. In a 
letter dated 23
rd
 of July 1623, D. Maria Coutinho declared the salvage undertaken by the 
enemies as 680,000 cruzados of the king and other particulars”220, most certainly a 
spelling mistake instead of 68.000 cruzados. In a letter to the king D. Filipe III, the 
Vice-king D. Francisco da Gama announced a new attempt to recover the artillery lost 
in the São José
221
. 
 Resulting from the survey and excavation campaigns that took place between 
2004 and 2007, the isolated wreck site MOG-003 (Mogincual-003) was discovered, 
documented and partially excavated at Infusse shoals
222
, part of the group of the 
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Mogincual shoal
223
. Due to the cultural material discovered, mainly Spanish coins in 
reales from the historical time period of the Spanish rule in Portugal (1580-1640), along 
with cannons permitted the identification of the wreck site as to be of the São José. 
Until now, from a sole section of the wreck site, Arqueonautas recovered and 
documented a total amount of 23,211 coins in reales, a total value of 146,918 reales, 
estimated as 16,528 cruzados based on the calculation of the equivalence of 1 reales de 
peso de a ocho as 0.9 cruzados
224
)
225
 which, in comparison with the historiographical 
information seems to be in accordance with the declared loss of 18,000 cruzados
226
.  
Some of the documented coin clusters enabled an observation of the amount of coins 
per case which, compared with the historical documentation
227
 appears to be similar. 
Furthermore, there have been a total of four bronze and five iron cannons at the wreck 
site MOG-003 documented and recovered in situ 
228
. 
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Figure 6: “underwater chart of the Infusse shoals”229 
 
 
 
III.5 1622 Naus Santa Teresa de Jesus and São Carlos 
 
 Like the nau São José, the naus Santa Teresa de Jesus and São Carlos were part 
of the 1622 outward bound fleet engaged in the Anglo-Dutch attack in July 1622. 
Having confirmed the situation of the São José, the two ships sailed for Mozambique 
Island trying to escape the enemy’s attacks, where, while entering the harbor at night, 
the Santa Teresa de Jesus struck and stranded on a sandbank or shoal, known today as 
Banco de São Lourenço and situated between the two islets São Jorge and Santiago and 
Mozambique Island. Following in her company, the São Carlos struck a shoal situated 
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Subaquática S. A. 
64 
 
in the vicinities of the São Sebatião fortress and remained stranded as well
230
. The 
Anglo-Dutch fleet concentrated their forces on the São José permitting the salvage 
attempts of the Portuguese that, at least, recovered part of the money and artillery of the 
São Carlos due to her favorable position in shallow waters close to the fortress
231
. 
Attempts of a total salvage of the Santa Teresa de Jesus were complicated and hindered 
by the currents and tides which enabled a salvage of some part of the king’s money and 
of the particulars stored on the upper decks but part of the cargo on the lower decks was 
lost
232
. However, the Vice-king D. Francisco da Gama announced the successful salvage 
of 29 cannons or pieces of artillery of the two naus, the Santa Teresa de Jesus and the 
São Carlos
233
. Both ships were set on fire to avoid salvage attempts by the Anglo-Dutch 
fleet of defense.  
Comparing the historiographical descriptions and documentation regarding the 
losses of the Santa Teresa de Jesus and the São Carlos with information obtained by the 
underwater archaeological survey of Arqueonautas Worldwide, an isolated wreck site, 
registered as IDM-017
234
, was discovered in 2004. Situated in the area of the São 
Lourenco bank, the shipwreck was tentatively identified as the 1622 Santa Teresa de 
Jesus which assumption was supported by a comparison of the recovered and 
documented artefacts and the historiographical description. Likewise, the situation of 
the 1608 nau São Francisco, the wreck site of the São Carlos, probably IDM-014
235
, 
cannot be identified with certainty due to the interference of cultural material in the 
possible area in the vicinities of the São Sebastião fortress. 
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234
 See: Alejandro Mirabal, Second Interim Report of the Marine Archaeological Survey performed in 
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 See: Alejandro Mirabal, Second Interim Report of the Marine Archaeological Survey performed in 
Ilha de Moçambique, from March to July 2004, p. 8. 
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III.6 1622 Dutch Jacht ’t Hert 
 
Soon after the second Anglo-Dutch fleet of defense arrived in Mozambican 
waters, the joint forces encountered a small Portuguese ship, São Pedro that after being 
captured in the area of 14,5ºS Lat., was burnt. As a result of the incident, the Dutch 
jacht ’t Hert of 280 tons236 was laid up, her cargo taken off and the ship ultimately lost 
upon the hard ground in the bay close to where the São Pedro was captured
237
. 
During the survey of 2004 campaign, an isolated wreck site documented as 
NAC-002 (Nacala, second documented wreck in the same area) was discovered at 
Quissimajulo Bay situated in 14
º
32´S latitude
238
. After studying the documented 
remains of the wood structure as well as the cultural material, prominently brick stones, 
an unusual cargo for Portuguese East Indiamen, along with the isolated position where 
no Portuguese outward bound or homeward bound shipwreck is documented, 
Arqueonautas concluded the tentative identification of the wreck site NAC-002 as most 
likely to be the 1622 ’t Hert239.  
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 See: R. Bruijn, F. S. Gaastra, I. Schöffer (eds.), op. cit., vol. II, pp. 40, f. 
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 See: The portuguese historiography indicates the the São Pedro incident as to have ocurred in the 
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cit. p. 2. 
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 See: Idem, ibidem; Alejandro Mirabal, Monitoring Report on the present condition of the NAC-002 
wreck site at Quissimajulo Bay. (April 2012). 
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Figure 7: “underwater chart of the Quissimajulo Bay”240 
 
 
 
III.7 Observation 
 
The critical analysis and introduction of the data obtained by the underwater 
archaeological survey and excavation campaigns by Arqueonautas Worldwide, 
Arqueologia Subaquática S.A. permitted a comparison of information from historical 
documentation and international historiography by which places of losses were 
confirmed, such as the case studies of the 1608 Nossa Senhora da Consolação, the 1622 
São Jose and the Santa Teresa de Jesus. Also, new information, especially concerning 
the case study of the Dutch 1622 ’t Hert, is added. Regarding the case studies of the 
1608 São Francisco and 1622 São Carlos, a definite attribution of a discovered wreck 
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 See: : “underwater chart of the vicinities of Quissimajulo Bay”, archive of Arqueonautas Worldwide, 
Arqueologia Subaquática S. A.. 
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site to an historical shipwreck is not possible due to the disturbance of the debris field 
discovered and documented in the vicinities of the shoals surrounding the São Sebastião 
fortress at Mozambique Island. 
Using the method of verification of artefacts and cultural material discovered, 
documented and recovered from historical shipwrecks by comparing with information 
obtained by historical research, both History and Underwater Archaeology as distinct 
human sciences serve the purpose of gaining knowledge derived from shipwrecks, in 
the case of the present study of the Portuguese Carreira da índia of the early 17
th
 
century. 
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IV Naus of the Carreira da Índia during 
the first half of the 17
th
 century 
 
IV.1 Shipbuilding theory and 
reconstruction based on shipwrecks 
 
 During the last three decades, a series of profound investigations on Iberian 
shipbuilding resulted in the analyses of shipbuilding treaties and the theory of 
shipbuilding, such as the galleons and naus of the 16
th
 and 17
th
 century. the theses and 
articles on Portuguese shipbuilding such as “Os Navios do Mar Oceano” by Francisco 
Contente Domingues, “The Nau of the Livro Nautico: The Textural Excavation of a 
Portuguese Indiaman” by Alex Hazlett, “O Livro da fábrica das naos de Fernando 
Oliveira: Princípios e Procedimentos da Construção naval” by Carlos Manuel 
Montalvão de Sousa, or “Os Galeões da Coroa de Portugal durante o period Filipino: 
Influências e Características” by Augusto António Alves Salgado are just some 
examples. The excavation and analysis of the remains of the wood structure of the nau 
Nossa Senhora dos Mártires that sunk in 1606 at São Julião de Barra in the vicinities of 
the mouth of the Tagus river, near Lisbon, Portugal, initiated a combined underwater 
archeological and historiographical approach for the reconstruction of Portuguese naus 
(or carracks), namely under Filipe Castro. Data obtained by the archaeological 
excavation, by then also enabled by the development of electronic devices during the 
1990s, permitted the virtual reconstruction of Portuguese ships of which, the Nossa 
Senhora dos Mártires was the first.  
Also, the comparison of data obtained by analyzing the historical documentation 
regarding shipbuilding processes, such as measurement units used with the underwater 
archaeological evidence, was a new approach confirming the knowledge at that time. 
 The discovery of the remains of the Nossa Senhora da Consolação, a Portuguese 
nau which was lost near the São Sebastião fortress at Mozambique Island in 1608 and 
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the subsequent reconstruction of the hull structure based on the model of the Nossa 
Senhora dos Mártires permitted an observation of Portuguese shipbuilding of the same 
type of ship, a nau, of the same time period, the beginning of the 17
th
 century, as both 
ships were either lost during their homeward or outward bound voyage within a two 
years difference. 
Still, the statement of Alex Hazlett, PhD affirming that there is less knowledge 
on Portuguese shipbuilding compared with the Spanish
241
 has yet to be confirmed. 
 As observed in chapter I.4, the Portuguese naus, like the Dutch retourshepen, the 
square stern ships or later Fluyts, were armed merchantmen.  
 Portuguese naus of the early 17
th
 century were three masted ships of an average 
total length of 40m, a keel length of approximately 27.5m and a beam up to 12m 
resulting in a length to beam proportion of almost 3/1 and a depth of the hold of circa 
8.8m
242
. Its three main masts were equipped with two square sails on each, the foremast 
and the mainmast, and a lateen sail on the mizzenmast. An additional square sail, the 
spritsail, was set in front of the foremast
243
. 
Based on the principles and tradition of carvel-built or skeleton-first ships, the 
process of constructing a nau of 18 rumos keel length which was mainly used during the 
early 17
th
 century, was initiated by the laying of the keel followed by the erection of the 
stern, the implementation of the masts and rudder and the prow
244
. Continued by the 
process of setting the U-shaped skeleton of the hull structure, the planks were set in a 
continuous and joint form on the outer side of the skeleton, a process also known as 
carvel-planking
245
. In comparison with the Portuguese and, in general, Iberian 
shipbuilding methods, Dutch ships were constructed by using the shell-first technology 
and clinker-planking method in which the construction of the frame precedes the setting 
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 See: Alex Hazlett, Idem, ibidem. 
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 Filipe Castro, “The Pepper Wreck, an early 17th-century Portuguese Indiaman at the mouth of the 
Tagus River, Portugal”, in The International Journal of Nautical Archaeology, [s.n.], [s.l.], 2003, vol. 
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Part2-Sails” in The International Journal of Nautical Archaeology, ed. Blackwell Publishing Ldt., 
Malden, Oxford, 2009, vol. 38.1, p. 113. 
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 See: Francisco Contente Domingues, Os Navios do Mar Oceano – Teoria e impiria na arquitectura 
naval portuguesa dos séculos XVI e XVII, op. cit, pp. 228-230. 
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of the planks
246
, unlike the Portuguese, set in an overlapping form, the clinker-planking. 
As the planks of a Portuguese ship were a structural element of the hull, the same were 
of a more reinforcing nature for Dutch vessels
247
. 
 
      
 
Figure 8: Scheme of clinker-planking  Figure 9: carvel-planking of a 
and carvel-planking
248
  Portuguese Nau
249
 
 
As shown in Table 4, Portuguese shipbuilding measurements during the 16
th
 and 
17
th
 century were indicated in palmos, palmos de goa, or rumos and not calculated in 
absolute values by the norms of the metric system, introduced in France in 1799
250
. 
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Unit 16
th
 /17
th
 century equivalent Metric equivalent 
   Palmo de vara 1/7 of a rumo 220mm 
Palmo de goa 1/6 of a rumo 256.7mm 
Vara 5 palmos de vara 1.10m 
Goa 3 palmos de goa 770mm 
Rumo 2 goas, 6 palmos de goa, 
 
 
or 7 palmos de goa 27.5mm 
Pelegada comum 1/8 of a palmo de vara 27.5mm 
Pelegada de goa 1 palmo de goa, 1 palmo de vara 36.7mm 
Table 2: “Measurement units used in Portuguese shipbuilding during the 17th century”251 
Observing the evolution of the naus during the late 16
th
 and early 17
th
 century 
and comparing with the naus of the earlier Portuguese navigation with a capacity of 
circa 500t, we can see a tendency of volume augmentation towards 700t and more, by 
elongation and enlargement
252
 as well as experimentation of ships with four decks 
instead of the commonly built three deck naus
253
. The analysis of historical 
documentation on shipbuilding demonstrates the absence of volume augmentation or 
capacity by using an additional deck
254
 due to the fact that the three deck naus were 
longer, of deeper draught and of higher distance between the decks themselves
255
. the 
use of naus with four decks and the enlargement of the ones with three, caused lesser 
maneuverability (passage of hazards, such as sandbanks or shoals, as well as suitable 
wharves).
256
 In times of naval warfare and economical changes, these were additional 
factors that explain the decline of the Portuguese Cape route shipping indicated by the 
personal experience of the Vice-king D. Francisco da Gama who, in 1622, had fought 
against the Anglo-Dutch fleet of defense in Mozambican waters
257
. The capacity of the 
ships, either galleons or naus, indicated in the historical documentation, refers to the 
lower decks, excluding the first deck or weather deck. 
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Figure 10: “Scheme of the organization of space per deck of a Portuguese nau”258 
  
 Armament and artillery were part of the outfitting of the naus but did not consist 
of a fixed assigned quantity depending on the capacity or size of the ship. Differing by 
the type of artillery, the naus were mainly equipped with iron cannons, the galleons 
mainly with bronze cannons
259
. At the end of an outward bound or homeward bound 
voyage, the ships were disarmed and the cannons and other armament stored in the 
royal storage facilities
260
. the outfitting of ships, cannons and other pieces of artillery 
did not always originate from ships of prior fleets but also from sunken ships like the 
case of the 1622 Santa Teresa de Jesus and São Carlos off Mozambique
261
 or vessels 
that after having been stranded and declared unseaworthy but were also acquired from 
foreign ships, mainly at the Tagus and Sado river in Portugal
262
. Due to the absence of 
detailed descriptions of the ships armament, either of the naus or galleons, given by 
accounts of the late 16
th
 and early 17
th
 century or historical documentation, a profound 
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analysis of the typology of the cannons and the projectiles used on board of Portuguese 
ships still remains an object of research but, generally speaking, ships were equipped 
with several types of smaller, medium and larger scale and size cannons based on 
carriages of two or four wheels using several types of projectiles depending on the 
purpose
263
. Observing the armament of Portuguese ships during the historical time 
period of the late 16
th
 and early 17
th
 century there are two affirmations which can be 
drawn from the historiography: first, the late phase of continuous use of types of 
artillery known since the early decades of the century
264
, the Berças, a small piece of 
artillery equipped with a chamber able to project a projectile of 3 pounds
265
, the 
Camelos, an old piece of artillery of small range
266
 and the Pedreiros, morters with 
large caliber which projected stone projectiles
267
; second, the introduction of the generic 
term “peça” meaning piece, the designations if either from the city, “da cidade” or from 
the Kingdom, “do reino” and the classification by weight in pounds268  
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IV.2 1606 Nossa Senhora dos Mártires 
 
 in 1606 the Nossa Senhora dos Mártires, sailing on her homeward bound voyage 
to the metropolis of the Portuguese Empire, Lisbon, in company of the Nossa Senhora 
da Salvação or Salvação was lost in the vicinities of the sandbanks near São Julião de 
Barra at the mouth of the Tagus river, Lisbon area, Portugal
269
. Registered and 
catalogued as SJB2, the second area consisting of cultural material and remains of a hull 
structure in the vicinities of São Julião de Barra
270
, the same were later identified as to 
be most probably of the 1606 Nossa Senhora dos Mártires
271
 based on historical 
documentation. Due to the fact that the remains of the wood structure were covered in a 
layer of pepper corns, the wreck site became also known as the Pepper Wreck.  
  The methodology applied was the division of the area of excavation into 
standardized grids, for the documentation in situ, the place of discovery before 
recovery, similar to terrestrial archaeology
272
 followed by the controlled destruction of 
the archaeological site for scientific purposes. This allowed obtaining first data 
regarding the measurements of parts of the hull structure, later confirmed by recovered 
parts
273
.   
 Based on the documented area of the wood structure remains, namely “the keel, 
an apron, eleven frames and twenty-six strakes of planking”274, approximately 
corresponding to “2/5 of the estimated original length of the keel and approximately the 
width of the flat of the floors, plus 1/3 of the extension of the main deck” 275, a virtual 
model of the hull structure was created using the data obtained from the archaeological 
survey and excavation campaigns compared with and applied to historical 
documentation of shipbuilding processes and construction plans of the historic time 
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period, especially the plan of a nau by Manuel Fernandes and Fernando Oliveira “Livro 
da fabrica das naus”276.  
 The model of the Nossa Senhora dos Mártires, or the Pepper Wreck, is based on 
a plan of Manuel Fernandes indicating a three deck nau of 18 rumos keel length but 
neither the historical documentation nor the archaeological remains were able to clarify 
the question whether the Mártires was a three of four deck nau. 
 
 
Figure 11: “The Pepper Wreck reconstructed after Fernando Oliveira’s Livro da fábrica das naus”277 
 
 Continued research by the method of application of historical information and 
the archaeological data obtained from the Nossa Senhora dos Mártires resulted in the 
reconstruction of a possible calculation of the outfitting process.
278
 A possible sail plan 
of a Portuguese nau was based on data obtained by the archaeological excavation of the 
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Swedish warship Wasa which sunk in Stockholm harbor 1628
279
 due to the fact that no 
sails of a Portuguese Indiaman but some sails of the Wasa had also survived
280
. 
 
 
Figure 12: “The sails of the Pepper Wreck”281 
 
 Observing the amount and weight of the ballast stones of the Nossa Senhora dos 
Mártires, the excavation of the remains did not permit an archaeological affirmation of 
the same due to the characteristics of the wreck site
282
. “Outfitting the Pepper Wreck”, a 
prolonged investigation of the knowledge of the Pepper Wreck revealed an estimated 
minimum weight of the ballast for a safe journey as to be circa 175t
283
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 In the chapter “Armament” of the same study, the authors refer to the fact of the 
difficulties in identifying and classifying the artillery used on board of Portuguese naus. 
Referring to the outfitting of naus of 600 tons of 1590, the study presents a general but 
explaining overview of various pieces of artillery used, such as the Berças, Falcões and 
Pedreiros
284
 
 
 
 
IV.3 1608 Nossa Senhora da Consolação 
 
As part of the second Portuguese outward bound fleet of 1607 under the 
command of D. João Correia de Sousa, the Nossa Senhora da Consolação was 
accompanied by three other ships, the nau Nossa Senhora do Loreto and the galleons 
São Felipe e Santiago and the Santo André. Whilst the Nossa Senhora do Loreto and 
the São Felipe e Santiago continued their voyage passing the Indian Ocean without 
passing Mozambique Island, the Consolação and Santo André entered the harbor in late 
August of the same year. as it was already too late for a continuous voyage, they were 
forced to winter at the said place. The Consolação was set on fire by the Portuguese to 
avoid a second attempt of seizure by the Dutch who were attacking the São Sebastião 
fortress. 
By using the principles and methodology of underwater archaeology, the wreck 
site IDM-003 was surveyed and excavated by Arqueonautas Worldwide, Arqueologia 
Subaquática S.A. during the course of several campaigns starting on 2000
285
. Divided 
into several grids, the wood structure remains and artefacts were, such as with Nossa 
Senhora dos Mártires, documented, registered but only the cultural material was 
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recovered; the remains of the hull structure were examined and measured in situ and not 
recovered
286
.  
Based on the documented area of the wood structure remains, believed to be “the 
complete part of the starboard half of the flat amidships”287, “36 floors between tail 
frames (18 each of the master frame) and 20.55m of the keel”288, the data obtained by 
underwater archaeological survey was compared with and applied to historical 
documentation using information given by the results of the reconstruction of the Nossa 
Senhora dos Mártires. 
The model shown in Figure 13 representing the wood structure remains of the 
Consolação was projected on a plan of a three deck nau by Fernando Oliveira but, as in 
the case of the Mártires it was not possible to determine whether the Consolação was a 
three deck or four deck nau. 
Removing the ballast stones and measuring the weight of the bags used resulted 
in an approximate total weight of ballast of 250t
289
. Also, the remains of the armament 
and artillery of the Consolação allowed an observation and comparison with the 
affirmation as observed in Chapter IV.1. Nevertheless, it must be taken in consideration 
that there has been human intervention during the past due to the low depth of the wreck 
site permitting salvage by the Portuguese stationed at Mozambique Island at the time of 
the loss. The iron cannons of the Consolação, four in total, are of a maximum total 
length of 2.44m and 0.35m diameter
290
. The excavation of the wreck site also revealed 
two different types of cannon balls, the first made of iron with a diameter of 0.07m and 
a weight of two kg, the second made of stone with a spherical shape and a diameter 
between 0.15m and 0.25m
291
 as well as lead shots of 35g weight and 18mm diameter
292
. 
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Figure 13: “Nossa Senhora da Consolação reconstructed after Manuel Fernandes Livro de Traças de 
Carpintaria”293 
 
 
 
IV.3 Observations 
 
National and international investigations and research of the past three decades 
have produced new knowledge regarding methodology of Portuguese shipbuilding. 
Regarding the theoretical part, the publications, the analyses of historic shipbuilding 
treaties such as Fernando Oliveira and Manuel Fernandes allowed a new understanding 
of measurement units and construction methods used. Probably without knowing, the 
same were basis for a new approach of understanding how ships, especially the naus, 
were built in the late 16
th
 and early 17
th
 century: the comparison of data obtained by 
underwater archaeological survey and excavation campaigns and the application of the 
same in virtual ship models. 
 While using different mechanisms surveying and excavating the wreck sites 
SJB2, believed to be the 1606 Nossa Senhora dos Mártires, also known as the Pepper 
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Wreck in the vicinities of São Julião de Barra, Lisbon area, Portugal, and IDM-003, 
believed to be the 1608 Nossa Senhora da Consolação in the vicinities of Mozambique 
Island, Mozambique, both Filipe Castro and Alejandro Mirabal came to similar results 
for a reconstructed hull of a nau whereas the process of the remodeling of the 
Consolação was based on the one of the Mártires. Although both models are based on a 
three deck nau, the archaeological artefacts, namely the remains of the wood structure, 
do not permit a determined observation whether both were either three deck or four 
deck naus. 
Both studies show different results of the ballast stones weight, the Consolação 
measured approximately a total of 250t, the theoretical calculations for the Mártires as 
to be of circa 175t minimum. 
The wreck site IDM-003 showed evidence of iron cannons used on board of 
Portuguese naus while MOG-003, most likely to be the 1622 nau São José, showed 
evidence of a mixed outfitting by bronze and iron cannons which, however ,do not 
confirm or refute a separation of cannons by metal and type of ship. 
A combined observation of the research of the historical documentation and the 
reconstructed ships based on underwater archaeology by Filipe Castro and Alejandro 
Mirabal permit a new approach for understanding the Portuguese naus of the late 16
th
 
and early 17
th
 century which were in a process of changes such as the experimental 
phase of using three and four deck naus as well as the augmentation of capacity in 
general, causing the loss of maneuverability.  
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V Monetary flows of the Portuguese outward bound 
armadas 1600-1625 
 
At the turn of the 16
th 
century, the Portuguese Estado da Índia, under the reign 
of the Habsburgs since 1580, saw the emergence of Dutch sails in the Indian Ocean. 
Challenging the Portuguese monopoly of the spice trade, several private companies of 
the Lower Countries merged into the Dutch United East India Company, the VOC, in 
1602. During the first decade of the 17
th
 century, the Portuguese trade with the Orient 
was faced with a decline of its revenues since the favorable position of being the only 
supplier of spices and other oriental goods for the European markets such as Amsterdam 
and London was lost. Also, the fact of a Portuguese contribution financing the Spanish 
forces against the Dutch rebellion took its share from the income of the cape route trade.  
Additional factors such as the increase of enemies’ attacks in the Atlantic and 
the Indian Ocean which resulted in an increasing number of losses of the Portuguese 
homeward and outward bound voyages weakened the Iberian financial situation
294
. 
Based on the revenues that resulted from the sale of the merchandise of the prior year’s 
homeward bound voyage, the Portuguese directly invested in the outfitting of the next 
years’ outward bound fleet. this system, based on regular income, stable market 
conditions such as demand, prices and supply as well as successful outward and 
homeward bound shipping, was fragile itself and vulnerable to new conditions. As 
extraordinary expenses such as the fortification of strategic coastal positions like the 
São Sebastião fortress at Mozambique Island, the important way-station of the Carreira 
da Índia turned into constant costs
295
, new forms of financing the Luso-Asiatic shipping 
were necessary in order to deal with the annual costs of shipbuilding and outfitting as 
well financial supply for the purchase of merchandise.  
Until 1598, private consortiums such as the Ximenes d’ Aragão either directly 
participated in the Portuguese Asiatic trade by outfitting the ships and providing money 
for the purchase of goods or were responsible for the selling and distribution of pepper 
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(and other merchandise) of the royal monopoly, the real fazenda
296
, a custom known 
since the early days of the Carreira da Índia. As the negotiations for a renewal of the 
pepper consortium failed, new forms of financing the Carreira were needed and an 
allotment, the forced acquirement of pepper by the leading New Christian merchant 
families was introduced in 1600
297
 . With it, the Portuguese crown guaranteed the 
selling of spices for a fixed price
298
. Initially thought as a temporary form of financing, 
the allotment continued during the following years until the decade of 1630
299
. 
Throughout the period of the Twelve Years Truce in which no more than some 
incidents occurred, no planned enemy attacks on the Portuguese cape route shipping 
took place and it was supposed that revenues from the Carreira, due to a peaceful 
environment, would have increased. Eventually, factors such as fraud, especially during 
the administration of Vice-king D. Jerónimo d’ Azevedo (1612-1617), hindered an 
improvement of the financial situation of the Estado da Índia
300
.  
During the decades of 1610 and 1620, King D. Filipe II of Portugal granted 
several rights of commercial voyages to the convent and monastery Nossa Senhora da 
Encarnação, found by his wife Queen Margaret of Austria. Documented since 1614
301
, 
revenues of several commercial voyages to China, India and Japan were dedicated to the 
maintenance of the said monastery to which, the king send 40,000 cruzados em reales
302
 
in 1618 and at least 10,000 cruzados em reales in 1622 
303
.  
The Spanish coins destined for the Portuguese Asiatic trade, the reales do peso 
de a ocho (the Spanish real or piece-of-eight), either originated from the Spanish 
overseas possessions in the New World, Mexico and Peru
304
 or were minted in Spain
305
; 
for this purpose, raw silver bars were send on board of the Silver Armada galleons. As 
the total amount of coins sent was declared in the Portuguese currency cruzados but 
consisted of Spanish reales, the total was usually declared as “cruzados em dez 
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reales”306. During the historical period analyzed in this thesis, no singular coin of ten 
reales was in circulation and several coins of four or eight reales were compiled for the 
Kings purposes. Since 1612 smaller coins of one real and two reales, referred to in the 
historical documentation as “reales singelos”307, had to be separated from the royal 
money, the cabedal, due to their lesser acceptance in India
308
. A coin of eight reales 
contained an average of 26g of Silver. Concluded by the historical documentation and 
analysis of artefacts documented and recovered from the 1622 São José wreck, it is 
estimated that an average amount of 500 to 550 cruzados in reales was assorted and 
stored in a straw bag which then, joined with several other, most likely four bags of the 
same kind, were stored in cases amounting an estimated total of 2,000 cruzados in 
reales per each case
309
. 
Generally, the monetary flows of the Portuguese outward bound armadas during 
the first quarter of the 17
th
 century, an average amount of 66,970 cruzados em dez reales 
was annually sent to India
310
.   
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Year Amount (in cruzados) Amount (in xerafins) Observations 
    
1598 40,000 
 
34.000 arrived, 1 ship lost in Brazil 
1607 40,000 
 
Naus S. Francisco, N. S. da Consolação 
1610 100,000 
  
1611 100,000 197,918 in 10 reales, 3 ships Gualdalupe, Piedade 
   
S. Phelipe 
1612 75,000 148,437 N.S. do Monte do Carmo, N. S. da Nazaret 
1613 40,000 
  
1614 90,000 179,111 N. S. da Luz, S. Phelipe, S. Boa Ventura 
1615 172,500 341,402 N. S. da Boa Nova, N. S. dos Remedios, 
   
N. S. de Nazare e N. S. de Jesus, Gualdalupe lost 
1616 40,000 79,166 N. S. do Vencimento 
1617 201,000 397,812 S. António, N. S. do Cabo,  
   
N. S. da Penha da França 
1618 120,000 237,500 S. Amaro, Capitania S. Carlos 
1619 80,000 162,732 S. Teresa, Boa Nova 
1620 80,000 161,772 N. S. da Guia, N.S. da Penha da França 
1621 80,000 160,000 S. Amaro, N. S. do Rosário 
1622 142,000 288,856 S. Teresa, S. Thome, S. Carlos, S. José (P. S.) 
   
Falta do cabedal 162.437 xerafins 
1623 218,000 476,000 1623, 1624 together, 1623 S. Isabel, Conceição, 
1624 
  
1624 Chagas, Quietação, S. João 
1625 80,000 162,000 S. Bartolomeu, S. Helena 
Table 3: “Monetary flows of the Portuguese outward bound armadas 1600-1625”311 
 
Portuguese accounts of transactions in India were documented in another 
currency, the xerafin that, according to statement of James C. Boyajian, was worth ¾ of 
a cruzado
312
, according to the statement of M. D. D. Newitt a cruzado was worth 400 
reis and the xerafin 360 reis
313
. Data obtained by the historical research in Portuguese 
archives show quite different values indicating an average equivalence of one cruzado 
as 1.97 to 2.03 xerafins
314
.  
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V.1 The armadas of 1622 and 1623 
 
 due to the missing letter written by the treasury council of Goa shortly after the 
arrival of the Vice-king D. Francisco da Gama in the Portuguese archives, the following 
observation of the amount of money sent on the outward bound fleet is a rather educated 
guess based on available historical documentation rather than on facts derived from an 
official declaration but, nevertheless, it serves the purpose of analyzing the monetary 
flow of a particular armada.  
Declared in the historical documentation, the cabedal sent from Lisbon to Goa on board 
of the 1622 Portuguese outward bound fleet and that actually arrived in India after the 
Anglo-Dutch attack in Mozambique, amounted to a total of 142,000 cruzados or 
288,856 xerafins
315
. The same document mentions the following ships: Sam Thome, 
Sam Carlos, Sam Jose (with a note “PS” after the ships name) and the Capitania Samta 
Tereza
316
. The same amount in cruzados, declared as 284,000 xerafins
317
 only mentions 
that the cabedal on board of the three ships of the Vice-king’s Company safely arrived 
in Goa with only 18,000 cruzados stored in nine cases, the case of the Santo Joseph 
being lost
318
. As presented in chapter III.4, the undated eye witness report of an 
unknown individual stated the loss of some money belonging to the particulars and 
merchants as well as the salvage of 30,000 cruzados in 15 cases of the King’s money or 
the cabedal
319
. As observed above, the Portuguese declaration by D. Maria Coutinho 
stated the loss of 680,000 cruzados
320
, the Dutch and English documentation and 
historiography as 68,553 reales of eight
321
.  
 Taking in consideration that the values mentioned in the historical documentation 
are absolute values, the following calculation models enable the assumption of the 
amount of money aboard each ship of the 1622 outward bound fleet. 
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 The same amount, 142,000 cruzados divided by the three ships which had safely 
arrived in India results in an average amount of 47,333 cruzados per ship. Adding the 
declared 18,000 cruzados with the 30,000 cruzados of the São José results in a total of 
48,000 cruzados, is similar to the prior result. 
 The amount of money of the three ships of the Vice-king’s company is declared as 
being 142,000 cruzados, the loss of the cabedal of the São José as 18,000 or 30,000 
cruzados, depending on the documentation. the salvage by the Dutch and English as an 
average of 68,000 cruzados which together amounted to a total of 228,000 or 240,000 
cruzados of four ships results in an average of 57,000 or 60,000 cruzados per ship 
including the money of the particulars and of the convent and monastery Nossa Senhora 
da Encarnação in Madrid that, on board of the Santa Teresa de Jesus, was of a 
minimum amount of 10,0000 cruzados
322
.  
  the amount of money of the three armadas of 1622, 1623 and 1624 arriving in 
India, a total of 529,252 cruzados
323
 permits another calculation. Included in the same 
document, the amount of money delivered to India in 1623 is stated as 104,000 
cruzados
324
, the amount for the following year as 110,000 cruzados
325
 resulting in 
315,252 cruzados left. Subtracting from this amount the 68,000 cruzados declared by 
the Dutch and English as well as the 18,000 cruzados or 30,000 cruzados by the 
Portuguese, results in a total of 229,252 cruzados or 217,252 cruzados.  
 A comparison of the calculations permits an estimated amount of money sent to 
India in 1622 as a total of, at least 220,000 cruzados, an average of 55,000 cruzados per 
ship. As stated above, this calculation is based on absolute values with the assumption 
of their correctness indicated in the historical documentation. 
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Indication Amount (in cruzados) Observations 
   
Cabedal of the 3 ships of the 
  
Company of D. Francisco da Gama 142,000 
 
Loss of the São José 18,000 in 9 cases 
Loss of the São José 30,000 in 15 cases 
Money of the convent and monastery 
  
Nossa Senhora da Encarnação, Madrid 10,000 
at least, amount used to purchase 
the ship Santa Cruz 
Salvage by the Dutch and English 68,553 In reales, Dutch and English 
  
Sources 
Salvage by the Dutch and English 65,000 Portuguese sources 
Coins recovered by Arqueonautas 23,528 Recovered until today 
Worldwide, Arqueologia Subaquática S.A. 
 
Excavation still in progress 
Estimated amount of the 1622 fleet 220,000 
 
Estimated amount per ship 47,333 
 
Estimated amount per ship 55,000 
 
Cabedal of the 1623 fleet 104,000 Amount which reached India 
Cabedal of the 1624 fleet 110,000 Amount which reached India 
Cabedal of the 1623 and 1624 fleet 218,000 Amount which reached India 
Table 4: “Figures of the 1622 Portuguese outward bound fleet” 
 
 The situation of the 1623 money sent on board of the Portuguese outward bound 
fleet symbolizes a particular case regarding the Portuguese trade in the East under the 
Spanish rule. As stated above, the commerce in Asia demanded great quantities of silver 
coins which derived from the New World. For the purpose of outfitting the 1623 
Portuguese fleet, the Lisbon administration was waiting for the delivery of the Silver 
fleet from the previous years, delayed due to a storm in the Caribbean. Eventually, at 
least three ships with silver coins on board, the Nuestra Señora de Atocha, the Santa 
Margarita and another documented ship were lost. Therefore, D. Filipe III had to accept 
a loan given by the  Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa to send a total of 200,000 
cruzados in Portuguese money instead of the Spanish reales
326
. Besides from this 
money on board of the three naus of the fleet, the King also sent 18,000 cruzados, 6,000 
cruzados in each galleon and an additional amount of 16,000 cruzados which came 
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from Castile
327
 in a total of 34,000 cruzados. The historical documentation states the 
arrival of 104,000 cruzados in India for the year 1623
328
 or 108,000 cruzados out of the 
218,000 cruzados of the combined account of the 1623 and 1624 fleet, of which the 
1624 fleet delivered a total of 110,000 cruzados
329
. 
 
Indication Amount (in cruzados) Observations 
   Cabedal send on board of the 3 Naus 
  Additional money send on board of the 200,000 
 3 Galleons 18,000 6,000 each 
Additional money send 16,000 from Castile 
Total amount 234,000 
 Cabedal declared as delivered in India 104,000 Declaration  for the year 1623 
Cabedal declared as delivered in India 108,000 
Account  of the 1623 and 1624 
fleet, 1624 fleet delivered a total of 
110,000 
Table 5: “Figures of the 1623 Portuguese outward bound fleet” 
 
  
 
V.2 Observations 
 
 Observing the Indo-Portuguese and, in a general perspective, the Indo-European 
trade during the historical time period of the first quarter of the 17
th
 century, European-
Asiatic commerce was based on the purchase of spices and oriental goods paid in silver 
coins. As Portugal was under the rule of the Spanish kings since 1580, the house of 
Habsburg, the demanded supplies of silver as commodity for the acquirement of the 
merchandise were coins mainly originating from the New World, especially the four 
and eight reales or the real de peso de a ocho, equivalent to 0.9 Portuguese cruzados, in 
                                                          
327
 See: Idem, ibidem. 
328
 See: AHU_CU_Índia, cx. 13, doc. 124, fol. 1v. 
329
 See: Idem, ibidem. 
89 
 
its turn, equivalent to 1.97 to 2.03 xerafins, the account currency used by the officials of 
the Portuguese Estado da Índia. 
 The outfitting of the Portuguese Carreira da Índia fleet depended on the delivery 
of the prior year’s delivery of the Silver fleets from Mexico, Peru and the Caribbean, 
i.e., a fragile supply chain with a worldwide dimension.  With the Portuguese trade in 
Asia already weakened by the emergence of the Anglo-Dutch concurrence causing 
lower revenues from the spice trade, the Lisbon administration was faced with an 
additional struggle to maintain the monetary flows and, as the case of the delay and loss 
of the 1622 Silver armada, had to arrange other solutions to finance the outward bound 
fleets.  
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VI Final Remarks 
 
 As it is shown during the course of the thesis, the historical phenomenon 
“Shipwrecks of the Carreira da Índia” which occurred in Mozambican waters during 
the chosen time span of 1595 and 1623 may and, I think, should be viewed through 
various angles and points, demonstrating a more complete picture of the early 17
th
 
century.  
Resuming the political situation in Europe, Portugal was under the dominion of 
the Habsburg Empire since 1580, a historical time period also known as the Union of 
the Two Iberian crowns (until 1640). Although there had been a separation of the local 
Iberian and overseas administration, Spanish political decisions also affected the 
neighboring country.  
Although it is known that the Dutch Asiatic shipping had its origins in the first 
voyage to the Spice Islands in 1595, based on the diary written by Jan Huygen van 
Linschoten, and the formation of several private companies unified in 1602 into the 
Dutch United East India Company (VOC), the question remains unanswered: Why did 
the Dutch, after a period of almost 30 years of struggle against the Spanish domination 
in the Low Countries, decided to undertake the first Asiatic voyage and not earlier? 
There are several factors which should be taken into consideration: Long distance 
travels to the origins of spices and other precious oriental goods were expensive and the 
outcome depended on the successful homeward bound voyage. Until the last decade of 
the 16
th
 century, the Iberian markets and ports, in our case, especially Lisbon, were 
opened to the merchants of Northern Europe. this situation changed by the decree that 
forbade the participation of foreigners on board of Asia bound ships as well as foreign 
shipping in Iberian waters, i.e., the direct access to the spice markets such as Lisbon, 
and the areas under the domain of the Portuguese and Spanish Empires, the origins of 
pepper, nutmeg, mace and other desired oriental goods. Also, the same embargo or 
neglected access symbolized a shortage of silver and coins such as the Spanish reales in 
particular. 
The first decade of the 17
th
 century, characterized by the three attempts to 
conquer Mozambique Island, the important way-station of the Portuguese cape route, 
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(1604, 1607 and 1608) and the losses of several Portuguese ships in Mozambican 
waters such as the 1608 Nossa Senhora da Consolação and the Bom Jesus caused by the 
Luso-Dutch naval conflicts, affected the Portuguese Carreira da Índia shipping in a 
phase of an already existing decline. A reduction of the volume of annual shipping, less 
revenues from the Asiatic trade due to lower prices at the European markets was 
accompanied by a continuous growth of Dutch-Asiatic shipping and fortification of 
economic relationships with local Asiatic authorities such as the King of Johor.  
After a span of 12 years of Truce (109-1621), the Luso-Dutch relationships 
appeased but the emergence of the English trade in the Persian Gulf region and South 
East Asian waters produced a new but yet just another economic and political 
concurrent for the Portuguese Estado da Índia.  
As the two North European countries agreed on the creation of two combined 
Anglo-Dutch fleets of defense at the end of the term of the Twelve Years Truce, the 
Portuguese negotiations for an extension of the Truce were unanswered and naval 
conflicts recurred. 1622 marked the renewal of a planned attack on the Portuguese 
outward bound shipping, resulting in the losses of the Santa Teresa de Jesus, the São 
Carlos and the São José off Mozambique. A planned repetition of a joint attack in the 
Western Indian Ocean was abandoned and shortly after the Anglo-Dutch alliance 
terminated due to the Amboina massacre in 1623. 
Whether the attacks on Portuguese Asiatic shipping in the Western Indian Ocean 
and Mozambican waters especially during the period of 1595 and 1623 had a significant 
direct or indirect impact on the increased losses, has been questioned and interpreted by 
several international authors in the past and present commonly examining the object of 
the study, the attacks, by decades. As demonstrated in Table 1, I obtained the method to 
show the losses of Portuguese outward bound and homeward bound fleets during the 
years of the attacks showing the figures of the total loss, as result of navigation, storms 
or accidents, as well as directly or indirectly related to the attacks per se vizualing the 
contemporary impact and effect. As a consequence of a successful outcome of naval 
combats and seizures of ships, the attacks represent a total percentage of the main factor 
for the losses occurred in 1607 and 1608 as 50 percent, in 1616 and 1622 as 100 
percent. As the shipwrecks have taken place due to other factors during the critical years 
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of Portuguese Asiatic shipping, the attacks do not account for the losses of ships in the 
years 1604 and 1623 as well as the separated fleets of 1607, 1608 and 1622. 
Still, the direct or indirect implications of shipwrecks such as the loss of the 
means of transport, cargo and human resources which had to be replaced as well as 
shortage of money supply for the purchase of oriental goods or cargo at the Lisbon 
market have to be taken in consideration during the historical time period of the early 
17
th
 century. 
The passage of the Mozambique Channel has been a hazard for the Carreira da 
Índia since its early days as sandbanks and shoals, especially in the vicinities of the 
Primeiras Islands group and Mozambique Island sometimes reach up to several nautical 
miles into the channel. Naus, the Portuguese armed merchantmen of the Carreira da 
Índia suffered a phase of volume augmentation and experiments of four deck ships 
instead of the commonly used three deck ships. In times of decline, of economical and 
political changes, passing from the only supplier of oriental goods at the European 
market to the concurrence from the Dutch and English, the transformation of the 
Portuguese Indiamen had also an impact on the losses.  
Lastly, the analysis of the monetary flows of the Portuguese outward bound 
shipping permits an examination of the quantity and origins of coins, the cruzados em 
reales, mainly originating from the New World, were transported on board of Spanish 
galleons to Seville (Spain), transferred to the Lisbon Casa da Índia and finally sent on 
Portuguese ships towards India demonstrating the worldwide dimension of the 
Portuguese Asiatic trade under the Habsburg in the early 17
th
 century.  
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